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This Article identifies four conceptions of insurance that have operated in the 
debates about insurance law in recent decades, analyzes these conceptions, and 
examines the normative agendas that drive them. These are the contract, public 
utility/regulated industry, product, and governance conceptions. Although these 
conceptions adopt very different perspectives, each is a way of struggling with the 
two fundamental questions that modern insurance law has continually faced. The 
first question involves the extent to which the language of an insurance policy 
should determine its legal effect. This is the insurance law version of the age-old 
question concerning the validity of one-sided provisions in contracts of adhesion. 
Because virtually all insurance policies, including high-end corporate insurance 
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policies, are standard-forms, it is a question at the core, not the periphery, of 
insurance law. The second question involves the proper influence of what are 
sometimes called “public law” values on the scope of private insurance coverage. 
This is a question with which much of modern private law struggles. To what 
extent should private law be about doing justice between two contracting parties, 
and to what extent should it also be concerned with other, more nearly public law 
matters? Public law matters such as the impact of litigation outcomes on the future 
behavior of other parties or the equal treatment of similarly situated policyholders. 
Ultimately, the Article argues, adopting a particular conception of insurance is no 
substitute for making or rejecting the normative choices that each conception entails. 
It is not our concepts, but our political, economic, and social values that underlie 
and underwrite legal doctrines and practices. Nonetheless, sometimes we do not see 
through our conceptual structures but instead are led around by them. This is part 
of what is taking place in the contests among different conceptions of insurance. In 
such circumstances, the kind of critical analysis this Article undertakes is required to 
expose the normative agendas that are doing the actual work within each conceptual 
structure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the ways that contests over the proper content of a body of legal 
rules take place is through competing descriptions of the subject matter that 
the rules address. When we “describe” a subject—when we create a concep-
tion of a subject by explaining, giving an account of, or making sense of it—
the description is likely to have normative implications. It is easy enough to 
get an “ought” from an “is”1 when a particular subject or phenomenon 
typically has distinctive norms associated with it.  
This is an Article about different descriptions of insurance and the fea-
tures of insurance law that might flow from them. In recent years, the 
contest often has been among different ways of describing insurance in 
terms of something else. The contest, that is, has been over competing 
metaphors and analogies. Each metaphor creates, develops, or calls upon a 
different conception of insurance in service of a particular view of what 
insurance law should be or do. Thus, normative agendas have driven the 
choice of metaphor. 
My goal in this Article is to identify four different conceptions of insur-
ance that I have discerned in the debates about insurance and insurance law 
in recent decades, to analyze these conceptions, and to examine the norma-
tive agendas that drive them. Ultimately, in my view, adopting a particular 
conception of insurance is no substitute for making or rejecting the norma-
tive choices that each conception entails. Going back at least to the legal 
realists we have understood that it is not our concepts, but our political, 
economic, and social values that underlie and underwrite legal doctrines and 
practices.2 Nonetheless, sometimes we do not see through our conceptual 
structures but instead are led around by them. This is part of what is taking 
place in the contests among different conceptions of insurance. In such 
circumstances, critical analysis is required in order to expose the normative 
agenda that is doing the actual work within a conceptual structure. 
To accomplish this, at points I must extrapolate from the existing case 
law, scholarly literature, and policy statements of actors in the field, because 
the four conceptions of insurance are not equally coherent, developed, or 
systematic. In addition, some of their features are obviously directed at 
legal doctrine, but some make no claim to have express implications for 
doctrine. Nevertheless, conceptions that purport to describe aspects of 
 
1 See John R. Searle, How to Derive “Ought” from “Is,” 73 PHIL. REV. 43, 56-58 (1964) (arguing 
that descriptive statements of fact can give rise to normative statements). 
2 See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 517, 
519 (2006) (describing the legal realist view that judges resolve disputes based on subjective 
ideological preferences rather than objective legal doctrine). 
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insurance or insurance law necessarily have implications for insurance law 
doctrine. This does not mean that the conceptions are comparable in every 
regard. Rather, they attempt to confront or criticize different features of 
insurance. None of the four conceptions is (and probably could not be) a 
full-blown model of insurance. Instead, they compete for overlapping, but 
not wholly coincident, territory, and none of them attempts to capture all of 
insurance or all of insurance law.  
Each, however, is a way of struggling with the two fundamental ques-
tions that modern insurance law continually has faced. The first question 
involves the extent to which the language of an insurance policy should 
determine its legal effect. This is the insurance law version of the age-old 
question concerning the validity of one-sided provisions in contracts of ad-
hesion.3 Because virtually all property-casualty insurance policies, including 
high-end corporate insurance policies, are standard-forms used by most 
insurers,4 it is a question at the core, not the periphery, of the law of 
insurance. The second question involves the proper influence of what are 
sometimes called “public law” values on the scope of private insurance 
coverage. This is a version of the question with which much of modern 
private law struggles.5 To what extent should private law focus on doing 
justice between two contracting parties, and to what extent should it be 
concerned with other, more nearly public law matters, such as the impact of 
litigation outcomes on the future behavior of other parties or equal treat-
ment of similarly situated policyholders? The very idea of insurance 
involves a group of individuals or entities in an indirect relationship, 
without any contract specifying the terms of that relationship. Concerns 
that involve public law values, such as discouraging moral hazard or ensuring 
the equal treatment of policyholders, naturally arise when no contract 
specifies the rights and obligations of the parties to an indirect relationship. 
And because insurance is a device that is used in other legal regimes that 
 
3 See e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632-33 (1943) (describing the conflict courts face when enforcing harsh 
terms in standardized contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power). 
4 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 31 (5th ed. 2010). 
5 See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 524-25 
(2003) (criticizing certain theorists’ view of tort law as a de facto administrative agency designed 
to “regulate behavior on a forward-looking basis”); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in 
Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 905-08 
(1984) (arguing that costs for mass exposure litigation should be decreased to enable the tort 
system to act as a “public law mechanism[]”). 
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openly pursue public law values—tort6 and corporate law,7 for example—it 
is almost inevitable that insurance law will be asked to support these 
pursuits. 
 These two fundamental questions are of course related. The greater the 
influence of public law values on the interpretation of insurance policy 
language, the less determinative of an insurance policy’s legal effect the 
language of the policy is likely to be. But public law values influence more 
than just the legal effect given to insurance policies; these values may 
influence the coverage that insurance policies provide in the first instance 
and the prices different policyholders pay. 
It is worthwhile at the outset to briefly summarize the four conceptions. 
The contract conception8 understands insurance as a voluntary agreement 
between an individual policyholder and an insurer, subject to the constraints 
and rules of construction that are ordinarily placed on such agreements by 
the law of contracts. This conception supplies the “literal” view of insurance 
to which the other conceptions, understood as metaphors or analogies, 
contrast themselves. Under the public utility/regulated industry conception,9 
contract is a mere tool for bringing the regulated relationship into existence. 
On this view, insurance is a cartelized industry selling a good sufficiently 
essential that it requires government regulation in the public interest. The 
product conception10 sees insurance more as a tangible good than a promise to 
perform financial services, and therefore appropriately subject to rules 
analogous to those that govern defectively designed products. Tort, rather 
than contract, is the core paradigm in this conception. Finally, the govern-
ance conception11 views insurance as a surrogate for government in controlling 
behavior and protecting against misfortune, as well as an organizational 
arrangement among policyholders. These governance relationships create 
the risk of abuse by the insurer for its own ends, and for the ends of the 
majority of policyholders at the expense of the minority. Insurance law 
rules, analogous to those that protect the populace against government and 
the minority of the populace against overreaching by the majority, are 
therefore desirable. 
 
6 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW 
FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 193-97 (2008) (exploring how both first-party and 
liability insurance influenced the development of tort liability). 
7 See TOM BAKER & SEAN GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 44-51 
(2010) (examining the role of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in corporate liability). 
8 See infra Part I. 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 See infra Part IV. 
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I. THE CONTRACT CONCEPTION 
The traditional and dominant conception of insurance is that it is a con-
tract transferring a risk of loss to a party whose business is selling such 
contracts, rather than as an incident of another transaction.12 The language 
of an insurance contract, an insurance policy, is the agreement of parties.  
The contract conception is the dominant way of understanding insur-
ance for good reason. Private insurance comes into being through, and is 
largely embodied in, contracts. The contract conception is the most accurate 
description of what insurance is; it is also the way insurance law most often 
treats insurance. Most judicial decisions, and most insurance law scholarship 
(my own included), unselfconsciously employ or reflect the contract concep-
tion. Indeed, the other conceptions are in a sense metaphorical precisely 
because of their relation to this conception. They define insurance in terms 
of something else, and in some measure by reference to their differences 
from the contract conception. 
A. Tensions in the Core Conception 
The contract conception has a powerful gravitational pull. In coverage 
disputes, insurers often simply point to the language of the policy at issue in 
support of their denial of coverage. Such a move is not so much an argu-
ment as it is an assertion of the contract conception. In contrast, a policy-
holder seeking to avoid the language of the policy must fit himself within 
one of the circumscribed exceptions to the prime axiom of the contract 
conception that the language of the contract governs. Courts commonly 
remind the parties that an insurance policy is, after all, a contract, and that 
departures from the contract must be limited if the contract is to have any 
meaning.13 
The contract conception also heavily influences insurance law scholars. 
It is the basis for arguments against the expansion of policyholder rights 
 
12 See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 3 (describing insurance as a “risk-transfer from compara-
tively risk-averse to less risk-averse or risk-neutral parties”). 
13 See, e.g., Smith v. Am. Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus, 584 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 
2009) (“[A]n insurance policy is a contract between the parties . . . .”); Adams v. Reliance 
Standard Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n insurance policy is a contract, 
and the general rules of contract construction apply to insurance agreements.”); TNT Speed & 
Sport Ctr., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 731, 732 (8th Cir. 1997) (“An insurance policy is a 
contract and the rules of contract construction apply.”); Park-Ohio Indus., Inc. v. Home Indem. 
Co., 975 F.2d 1215, 1218 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n insurance policy is a contract, and the parties’ rights 
under the policy are purely contractual in nature.”). 
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and protections,14 and it is the necessary target of criticism for arguments 
favoring the expansion of these rights and protections. Scholarly analyses 
identify the purposes and justifications of policy language that limits 
coverage, citing, for example, the threats of adverse selection and moral 
hazard to explain why adherence to policy language seeking to combat these 
threats is desirable.15 Critics then attack these analyses on the ground that 
the threats are exaggerated and coverage exclusions overbroad. 16  This 
scholarly debate takes place on the playing field that the contract conception 
has created. 
One of the difficulties with the contract conception as a description of 
insurance, however, is that it trades on the way the law treats insurance. It 
is a conception of insurance law, and only through that conception of law is 
it a conception of insurance. To the extent that the law treats insurance 
transactions as contracts, that is what they are. But if we set aside the 
applicable legal regime, the contract conception becomes contestable. To 
put this point another way, the accuracy of the contract conception depends 
on what a contract is. 
If what we understood to be the insurance contract were only the terms 
to which the parties subjectively assented, then the contract conception 
would ordinarily be deeply flawed, for there would be almost no such 
contract. It is true that some insurance comes into being as a result of 
knowing, voluntary agreement by the parties regarding the actual terms of 
their contract. But as scholars have repeatedly noted, most actual insurance 
transactions do not involve subjective assent to many of the provisions in an 
 
14 See, e.g., Roger C. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed Oper-
ations—What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 441 (1971) (stating that products 
liability insurance exclusions preclude coverage for damage to the insured’s own product because 
they cover tort liability for physical damage to others, not contractual liability for economic loss); 
Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not 
Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 194 (1995) (“While insurance contracts 
contain mainly optimal terms, the ambiguity rule interprets such terms inefficiently.”); Alan O. 
Sykes, “Bad Faith” Refusal to Settle by Liability Insurers: Some Implications of the Judgment-Proof 
Problem, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 77, 84 (1994) (noting the argument that “the delegation of settlement 
authority to the insurer is often optimal for parties to an insurance contract and that lawsuits after 
the fact by disappointed insureds represent an effort to renege on an implicit bargain”). 
15 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 942, 946 (1988) (suggesting that adverse selection and moral hazard create asymmetrical 
uncertainty, where the insured has more information than the insurer, and that this impedes 
insurance from working efficiently). 
16 See, e.g., Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 276-77 (1996) 
(questioning some of the assumptions underlying the moral hazard concern and arguing that it 
should play less of a role in legal and policy analysis); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in 
Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1240 (2004) (criticizing the adverse 
selection model due to its “serious empirical and theoretical problems”). 
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insurance policy.17 First, because most insurance policies are written on 
standard forms, the insurer is highly familiar with the terms of the policies 
it sells. But most individuals know little about what they are purchasing. 
They purchase insurance through intermediaries such as agents and the 
amount of explanation they typically receive regarding the terms of cover-
age is minimal. For virtually all individuals, insurance policies are complex 
documents with terms they neither read nor understand.18  
Second, there are structural obstacles to giving informed assent to the 
terms of an insurance policy. Insurance policies are offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, thus reducing a policyholder’s incentive to study the terms 
being offered. Moreover, these contracts are not merely adhesive, but super-
adhesive. For instance, health insurance is often employment-based group 
coverage, the terms of which are negotiated by the employer.19 And, more 
importantly, in property-casualty lines of insurance—where standard-form 
policies are the norm—all insurers offer the same standard policy on the 
same take-it-or-leave-it basis.20 Comparison of the terms offered by differ-
ent insurers, except for price differences, is therefore pointless. In any 
event, ordinarily the policyholder does not receive the policy containing the 
terms in question until weeks or months after the purchase, at which point 
the parties are bound. Thus, any knowledge of the terms that the occasional 
policyholder gains by reading the policy at that point has no bearing on the 
policyholder’s intent at the time of purchase.  
For sizable businesses and other institutions, contractual intent and un-
derstanding are potentially more plausible and meaningful notions. These 
entities have access to attorneys and insurance brokers to advise them. Some 
have personnel with insurance expertise and responsibility. Part of these 
entities’ business planning involves making decisions about the insurance 
they wish to purchase. Even for these entities and their insurers, however, 
the notion of contractual intent is often problematic. In my experience, 
 
17 See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form 
Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 242 (2007) (“[T]he 
consumer’s subjective assent to each and every term in the standard form is not necessary in order 
for there to be an operative manifestation of assent.”). 
18 See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a)(4) (1988) 
(“Relatively few policyholders ever examine their insurance policies with the care that would be 
required for even moderately detailed understanding of coverage limitations.”). 
19 The employee may receive a certificate of insurance, but the actual master insurance 
“policy”—typically a document of considerable length—is maintained somewhere in the files of 
the employer. 
20 ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 31. But see Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standard Insurance 
Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1277-1308 (2011) (demonstrating that the terms of consumer 
homeowners’ insurance policies vary across carriers). 
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commercial policyholders’ own “experts” frequently are not conversant with 
many of the terms of the numerous insurance policies that their employers 
or clients purchase. 
As in contract law generally, the fault lines in insurance law reveal the 
tension between all these facts on the ground and the way contract law 
treats them. Writing nearly seventy years ago, Friedrich Kessler identified 
the assumptions underlying the contract conception. “A person is supposed 
to know the contract that he makes. . . . Either party is supposed to look out 
for his own interests and his own protection. Oppressive bargains can be 
avoided by careful shopping around. Everyone has complete freedom of 
choice with regard to his partner in contract . . . .”21  
Thus, the very notion of contractual intent presupposes that the parties 
know the terms of their agreement and have the capacity to bargain about 
those terms. When these conditions are not present there may still be intent 
to be bound,22 but there will also be uncertainty over whether the content of 
that intent can be inferred from the fact of agreement itself. Courts often 
say that the purpose of interpretation of the terms of insurance policies is to 
ascertain the intent of the parties, as expressed in the policy.23 But in 
insurance, this must ordinarily be objective intent, which is something of an 
oxymoron. The objective theory of contract must accommodate the law of 
insurance contracts to the reality of actual insurance transactions. The 
objective theory holds that assent to a contract constitutes assent to all of its 
terms, whether or not they are understood or subjectively agreed to, and 
whether or not they are standard-form or individually negotiated. Excep-
tions to these presuppositions are necessarily narrow24: otherwise, the whole 
 
21 Kessler, supra note 3, at 630. 
22 See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 634-35 
(2002) (contending that under the consent theory of contract, the assent that is “critical” is not the 
promise to do something, “but the manifested assent to be legally bound to do so”). 
23 See, e.g., Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mara, 699 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446 (D. Conn. 2010) (“In 
Connecticut, insurance policies are construed according to general rules of contract interpretation. 
They are thus enforced in accordance with the parties’ intent, as derived from the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the policy’s terms.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Nicky & Claire’s Day Care, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (W.D. Tex. 2009) 
(“Courts must interpret policies ‘to ascertain the true intent of the parties as expressed in the 
instrument.’” (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 
1995))); NorFab Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 555 F. Supp. 2d 505, 509 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (“The 
court’s ‘task is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the terms used in the written 
insurance policy.’” (quoting 401 Fourth St., Inc. v. Investors Ins. Grp., 879 A.2d 166, 171 (Pa. 
2005))); John S. Clark Co. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 2d 758, 764 (M.D.N.C. 2004) 
(“Because the intent of the parties is derived from the language in the policy, the language of the 
policy necessarily controls the interpretation of the policy.” (citations omitted)). 
24 See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1173, 1185 (1983) (noting that exceptions are available only under narrow circumstances). 
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contract conception would be called into question. This is the Achilles heel 
of the contract conception. 
Moreover, even if there were actual, meaningful intent, the standard-
form nature of insurance would render the contract conception problematic. 
Certain features of standard-form insurance policies are drafted at a level of 
generality and with an issue-postponing vagueness that renders them 
incompletely specified. This characteristic affects many kinds of contracts, 
but it has a special significance in insurance. For instance, different policy-
holders may have different intentions or expectations regarding the scope of 
coverage that policy language incompletely addresses. Gap-filling interpre-
tative methods that look to the intentions of the particular parties to an 
insurance policy would therefore threaten to undermine the standard-form 
character of the policy. In practice, standard policy language would then 
have a set of nonstandard meanings. So the subjective intent of any given 
commercial policyholder, even if it existed, ordinarily must be irrelevant.25 
For this reason, the contract conception must presuppose something like a 
uniform intent on the part of all policyholders. But a uniform intent comes 
close to being no intent at all, and without any intent it is difficult to see 
what is left of the contract conception other than the words on the page. If 
these are not to be both the beginning and the end of the matter, then 
something beyond the contract conception is necessary to capture the full 
significance of the insurance transaction. 
B. Administrative and Judicial Regulation of Insurance Contracting 
Insurance law has developed two devices that adjust to the differences 
between the pure contract conception of insurance and the realities of the 
insurance marketplace. These devices, which regulate the market in which 
insurance contracts come into existence, imply that insurance law regards 
the contract conception as inaccurate. One device operates ex ante and the 
other operates ex post.  
First, state administrative regulation requires premarket approval of the 
terms of insurance policies. Insurers licensed to do business in a state must 
first secure approval from the state’s insurance commissioner or other 
official of any policy they wish to sell or of any amendment to the terms of 
 
25 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. a (1981) (stating that a party’s 
intent is what is manifested in the agreement, not any subjective, undisclosed intention); Michelle 
E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 
1110 (2006) (arguing that courts subordinate the meaning an individual party may attach to 
contract language to the goals of “fairness and future clarity, and, in the insurance context, the 
‘reasonable expectations’ of the policyholder”). 
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a policy already being sold in that state.26 In addition, under traditional 
insurance regulation, premium rates also require regulatory approval.27 This 
consumer protection function is designed to neutralize insurers’ asymmetric 
expertise and to counterbalance the structural obstacles that prevent ordinary 
individuals from understanding their policy’s terms.28 Ideally, the insurance 
commissioner stands in the shoes of potential policyholders, disapproving 
policy terms that would be unacceptable to purchasers if they were in a 
position to understand, bargain about, or reject them.  
In practice, however, authority to regulate policy forms and premium 
rates is only lightly exercised, except for occasional forays into the high-
volume consumer auto and homeowners lines of insurance. One reason is 
that regulatory resources are extremely limited, given the sheer volume of 
policy form and rate filings.29 Realistically, regulators can scrutinize only a 
small percentage of filings. They tend to focus where scrutiny will have the 
most impact.30 But as Daniel Schwarcz has recently shown, in the field of 
homeowners insurance there are variations in policy language from the 
standard-form industry-wide policy that are disadvantageous to policy-
holders.31 This has come as a surprise to some observers, probably including 
the regulators. It is a significant regulatory failure. 
Another reason for limited insurance regulation, at least in the regula-
tion of premium rates, is that price competition, one of the classic features 
of a contract regime, has become more common in recent decades.32 
Competition thus often regulates rates without the need for governmental 
intervention. Nevertheless, the fact that policy language and premium rates 
 
26 See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 119 (discussing the authority of state insurance commissioners). 
27 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 18, § 8.4(a) (overviewing the goals and potential 
methods of premium rate regulation). 
28 See id. § 8.2(a) & nn.1-2 (listing the avoidance of insurers’ overreaching as one of the main 
goals of insurance regulation). 
29 See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 142 (noting variation in the resources and effectiveness of 
state insurance departments). 
30 See id. at 142-43 (surveying the rationales insurance commissioners may use to target their 
resources to specific goals or problems). 
31 See Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 1314-317 (concluding that such discrepancies could result in 
“consumer exploitation”). 
32 Premium rates charged by the entire industry sometimes move abruptly in the same direc-
tion, however. This phenomenon is known as the underwriting cycle. See Kenneth S. Abraham, 
Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 400-01 (1987) (discussing the 
causes of the underwriting cycle and how it could explain industry-wide changes in premium rates 
in past decades); Kyle D. Logue, Toward A Tax-Based Explanation of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 
82 VA. L. REV. 895, 907-12 (1996) (explaining the insurance-cycle theory as a way of understanding 
changes in product-liability market rates). 
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are subject to governmental regulation, even if they frequently are not 
actually regulated, is difficult to square with the contract conception.  
The second device that adjusts the contract conception to the realities of 
the market is judicial regulation of the terms of insurance policies, which 
takes place largely, though not entirely, by means of interpretation. The 
maxim contra proferentem directs that ambiguities in a contract be construed 
against its drafter. 33 Nowhere is this maxim invoked more frequently than 
in insurance disputes, where the drafter is virtually always the insurer.34 As 
a consequence, ambiguous policy provisions—those that are susceptible to 
more than one reasonable interpretation—are construed in favor of the 
policyholder. Robert Keeton and Alan Widiss note, however, 
[t]here are literally thousands of judicial opinions resolving insurance 
coverage disputes in favor of claimants on the basis that a provision of the 
insurance policy at issue was ambiguous and therefore should be construed 
against the insurer. There are also numerous judicial opinions that predicate 
the result on the theory of resolving an ambiguity against an insurer in situ-
ations which clearly appear to be beyond what seem to be the reasonable 
bounds for applications of the ambiguity theory. In many of these cases . . . 
the conclusion is almost inescapable that the courts found an ambiguity 
where none existed.35 
The courts thus often use contra proferentem as a method of trumping, 
rather than interpreting, policy language. The contract conception cannot 
easily coexist with this practice. 
Courts in a minority of states are more open about judicial regulation. 
These courts apply a doctrine requiring them to honor the policyholder’s 
objectively reasonable expectation of coverage, even when unambiguous 
policy language would otherwise exclude or limit coverage.36 If it were 
given full reign, the expectations principle would constitute an open break 
with the contract conception. But the principle appears to be applied 
somewhat selectively even in the handful of jurisdictions that have adopted 
 
33 Boardman, supra note 25, at 1110 n.15. 
34 To be precise, in property-casualty insurance the drafter typically is the Insurance Services 
Office (ISO), a nominally independent entity that was once completely controlled by the 
property-casualty industry and is still heavily influenced by it. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 34, 
142 (narrating a brief history of the ISO and describing the potential for industry capture). The 
maxim contra proferentem, however, actually means “against the offeror.” Id. at 37. Thus, although 
the drafter of standard-form language usually is the ISO, the offeror is still the individual insurer 
issuing the policy. Contra proferentem is therefore properly applied to insurers who have not 
drafted the policies they issue. 
35 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 18, § 6.3(a)(2) (citations omitted). 
36 See id. § 6.3(a)(3) (describing the expectations principle and its justifications). 
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it.37 Therefore, in practice, the expectations principle, like its analog the 
unconscionability doctrine, does not wholly displace the contract concep-
tion, but operates in uneasy tension with it. 
Finally, a number of insurance policy provisions address complex prob-
lems in such simple language that they are necessarily incomplete. Liability 
insurance policies, for example, typically impose on the insurer a duty to 
defend suits seeking damages covered by the policy and afford the insurer a 
privilege to settle suits against the insured. In the course of elaborating the 
implications of the duty to defend and the privilege to settle, courts have 
adopted what amount to regulatory rules governing them. For example, a 
liability insurer that defends its policyholder without reserving its right to 
contest coverage is estopped from doing so,38 and a liability insurer that 
rejects a reasonable offer to settle a claim against its policyholder for an 
amount less than the policy limits is liable for the full amount of any 
judgment in excess of the policy limits.39 To describe these rules as “inter-
pretation” would stretch the meaning of that term beyond recognition. 
Of course, judicial gap-filling occurs in many contract disputes. And 
there is some debate about precisely what criteria the courts should use to 
interpret incomplete contracts.40 But the judicially created rules regarding 
liability insurers’ defense and settlement of suits against policyholders 
arguably go beyond any of these criteria. These rules are regulatory in 
 
37 Cf. id. (cautioning that there are meaningful differences in the ways that various jurisdictions 
apply the rule). 
38 Perhaps the seminal case on the issue is Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 419 P.2d 168, 179 (Cal. 1966). 
39 See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967) (“[A]n insurer should not be 
permitted to further its own interests by rejecting opportunities to settle within the policy limits 
unless it is also willing to absorb losses which may result from its failure to settle.”). 
40 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 106-07 (1989) (arguing that courts should use penalty 
defaults, rather than the defaults parties would have wanted, where penalty defaults encourage 
information sharing and clearer contracts); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual 
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 765-66 (1992) (advocating an 
“efficient contract rule” as a default rule to combat strategic behavior by parties to incomplete 
contracts); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 320 (1985) 
(criticizing the current rules of contract interpretation and suggesting that the state should provide 
better options from which parties could choose ex ante); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of 
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 615 (1990) (suggesting that a rigid 
interpretation of default rules would discourage compliance with informal social rules that 
promote cooperation); Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 1 (1993) (debating the utility of default rules and how, if at all, to improve their use in 
contract law); see also Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 
88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 504 (1989) (claiming that philosophical theories of contract do not 
adequately discuss the implications of default rules in contract). 
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character. The failure of insurers to alter these rules by redrafting their 
contracts is some evidence that insurers have accepted such judicially 
created rules, rather than that the rules have been imposed on them.41 
But perhaps the most important feature of the judicial regulation of insur-
ance—the feature that makes it more like regulation than mere adjudica-
tion—is that such judicial decisions have uniform and broad application. To 
be ambiguous, a policy provision must be susceptible to more than one 
“reasonable” interpretation; an objective standard is thus part of the test for 
ambiguity.42 And it is precisely the ambiguity of standard-form policy 
language that is usually at issue.43 Consequently, when a court holds that a 
policy provision is ambiguous and interprets it in favor of coverage, the 
holding applies to everyone whose policy contains that provision.44 By 
virtue of stare decisis, the holding declares the meaning of that standard-
form policy provision, not merely the rights of the particular policyholder 
whose claim is before the court. Judicial holdings honoring the “objectively 
reasonable” expectations of the policyholder as to coverage, notwithstanding 
contrary policy language, tend to have the same effect, for analogous reasons. 
What is objectively reasonable for one policyholder to expect is usually 
objectively reasonable for all who are covered by the same, standard-form 
policy. Similarly, rules governing the liability insurer’s policy-based duty to 
defend and settle are just that—rules that apply across the board to all 
 
41 On the other hand, in connection with the duty to defend, insurers have persistently 
asserted positions designed to circumvent the rules. For example, insurers have asserted the right 
to recoup defense costs from policyholders when the insurer has defended without an obligation to 
do so. Some courts have accepted these arguments and some courts have rejected them. See 
ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 648-49. I doubt that regulators would approve an express, policy-
based right to recoup in the manner that insurers have argued for in the courts. Auto and 
homeowners liability insurance policyholders are ordinary consumers without the funds to defend 
most suits against them. One of the main benefits of their insurance is that it provides them with a 
defense against suits that would fall within the terms of coverage. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 
18, § 9.1(a). Regulators would not approve the prospect that these ordinary consumers could be 
defended by their insurer but then sent a bill for tens of thousands of dollars for the insurer’s 
defense of a suit that the insurer claimed it had no duty to defend. So in this instance insurers 
have signaled some dissatisfaction with judicially created rules, though insurers are also attempting 
to avoid the constraints that administrative regulation would likely impose, by selectively 
obtaining judicial modification of prior judicial regulation. 
42 See, e.g., A.Y. McDonald Indus. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 618-19 (Iowa 1991). 
43 See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 624 (noting “an explosion of litigation over the duty 
to defend,” partly because “insurance policies state the duty in only general terms”). 
44 It is true that a court occasionally rules that an insurance policy provision is ambiguous in 
context or ambiguous as applied to the particular claim at issue. The contexts in which such 
rulings are made, however, tend not to be at all unique. Rather, the holdings in such instances 
apply to whole categories of claims and therefore are uniform in the sense described in the text. 
See, e.g., A.Y. McDonald Indus., 475 N.W.2d at 618-19 (holding that the term “damages”—used in a 
variety of consumer and commercial liability insurance policies—is ambiguous). 
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policyholders whose policies contain the same incomplete language govern-
ing defense and settlement.45  
In short, recognizing the breadth of administrative and judicial regula-
tion of insurance provides a striking contrast to the contract conception. 
Regulation combats asymmetric expertise and structural obstacles to the 
development of individual contractual intent by substituting the single 
judgment of an administrative agency or a court about the contents of an 
insurance policy for that of a disparate group of policyholders. But regula-
tion cannot fully rehabilitate contract in this field. Despite their potentially 
differing preferences, all policyholders still are offered standard-form 
coverage on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Regulation thus affects the content of 
the standard-form, but it typically does not mandate any greater opportunity 
for individual choice than insurers already provide their policyholders in the 
absence of regulation. Indeed, in the case of judicial regulation, insurers are 
free to modify offending provisions in their policies. As a result, insurers 
can repeatedly try to achieve the result they desire, by using language that 
has a greater chance of being found unambiguous. 
Judicial regulation, however, occurs only when enough is at stake in a 
dispute to warrant litigation, and courts do not have the same kind of 
expertise as insurance commissioners. They are ill-equipped, for example, to 
determine what different policyholders want or would be willing to pay for. 
On the other hand, the threat of each of these forms of regulation probably 
acts as a disciplining force that leverages the effect of regulation. Insurers 
may provide more coverage than they would if left to their own devices, 
with the hope of staving off administrative or judicial regulation that would 
require even more coverage. This inconsistency of the contract conception 
with the forms of regulation to which insurance contracts are subject, along 
with the perceived ineffectiveness of insurance law’s regulatory adjustments 
 
45 Moreover, consumers and commercial policyholders are, to a large extent, each others’ 
beneficiaries when it comes to judicial regulation. A standard-form policy provision usually is 
accorded the same meaning regardless of whether it is in an individual or a commercial policy. As 
such, when policies contain the same standard-form provision, judicial regulation—designed to 
protect individual policyholders—tends to benefit commercial policyholders as well. Correspond-
ingly, commercial policyholders may litigate coverage disputes and establish pro-coverage 
interpretations of standard-form provisions that no individual policyholder would find worth-
while, or could afford, to litigate. Individual policyholders are the beneficiaries of this litigation. 
The occasional exception to this parallel treatment of commercial and individual policyholders 
finds expression in the “sophisticated insured” doctrine adopted by a few courts. Under this 
doctrine, large corporations are precluded from taking advantage of contra proferentem. See, e.g., 
McNeilab, Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 525, 547 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding that a sub-
sidiary of Johnson & Johnson, a Fortune 500 company, could not take advantage of the contra 
proferentem doctrine because it was a sophisticated party).  
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to that inconsistency, help give rise to the alternative conceptions that I 
discuss next. 
II. THE PUBLIC UTILITY/REGULATED INDUSTRY CONCEPTION 
A second conception sees insurance as something like a public utility or 
regulated industry. The classic, technical definition of a public utility 
involves the provision of a good or service where there is a “natural” private 
monopoly that makes it impossible or impractical for more than one seller 
of the good or service to operate.46 Common carriers, providers of water 
and electricity, and operators of highways tend to be public utilities in this 
sense. Insurance is not.  
On the other hand, insurance has many of the same characteristics of 
public utilities and other highly regulated industries. Proponents of this view 
argue that insurance is affected with the public interest as an important 
good.47 Moreover, the insurance industry operates under cartel-like market 
conditions48 with a grant of immunity from the U.S. antitrust laws.49 
Therefore, the proponents of this view argue that the terms and conditions 
under which insurance is sold,50 as well as the price charged for insurance,51 
must be subject to regulation to serve the public interest.52 
 
46 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 12.1 (7th ed. 2007). 
47 “‘Water and power are essential for life,’ Mrs. Feinstein said. ‘So they are heavily regulated, 
and rate increases must be approved. Health insurance is also vital for life. It too should be strictly 
regulated so that people can afford this basic need.’” Robert Pear, Senate Democrats Lay Out a Plan 
to Regulate Health Insurance Premiums, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010, at A15; see also Spencer L. 
Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 
MINN. L. REV. 471, 523 (1961) (describing insurance as “crucial to the social fabric”). 
48 See The McCarran-Ferguson Act: Implications of Repealing the Insurers’ Antitrust Exemption: 
Hearing on S. 557 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 79 (2006) (testimony of J. 
Robert Hunter, Dir. of Ins., Consumer Fed’n of Am.) (asserting that anticompetitive behavior by 
the insurance industry caused a homeowners insurance crisis along America’s coastlines); Oversight 
Hearing on Insurance Brokerage Practices, Including Potential Conflicts of Interest and the Adequacy of the 
Current Regulatory Framework: Hearing on S. 736 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Mgmt., the Budget, and 
Int’l Sec. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 66, 71 (2004) (testimony of Eliot 
Spitzer, N.Y. Att’y Gen.) (asserting that a “network of insurance brokers and insurance carriers 
essentially creates a secret cartel based on hidden payments and preferential treatment” and calling 
for more federal regulation); Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 397, 404 
(1988) (asserting that industry conduct indicates the existence of collusion in price-setting). 
49 See The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006) (exempting the business 
of insurance in a state from federal antitrust laws provided that a state regulates the industry). 
50 See Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 146-47 (2008) 
(arguing that, to determine the meaning of insurance policies, courts should emphasize regulatory 
goals and strategies rather than freedom of contract and the parties’ intentions). 
51 See Why is Regulation of Insurance Necessary?: Before the Task Force on Long-Term Solutions For 
Florida’s Hurricane Insurance Market 5 (2005) (statement of J. Robert Hunter, Dir. of Ins.,  
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In some significant ways the formal structure of insurance regulation in 
the United States conforms to the public utility/regulated industry concep-
tion. The insurance industry is exempt from the reach of U.S. antitrust laws 
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act to the extent that insurance is regulated 
by state law.53 The states in turn permit certain arguably anticompetitive 
practices such as industry-wide preparation of property-casualty insurance 
policy forms and the pooling of data on loss and claims experience.54 But in 
return for this federal and state antitrust immunity, the states retain 
authority to disapprove of policy forms and to regulate premium rates in a 
way that permits a fair rate of return but is suspicious of excess profits.55 
States also have promulgated special investment and accounting standards 
designed to help ensure the solvency of insurance companies.56 
Beyond these formalities, the accuracy of the public utility/regulated 
industry conception varies with the type of insurance. The most accurate 
statement of this conception would be that, because insurance is embodied 
in a complex and difficult-to-understand document, heavy regulation is 
warranted when it involves a form of coverage that is close to essential for 
individual well-being. This rationale for regulation is less like the rationale 
 
Consumer Fed’n of Am.), available at http://www.myfloridacfo.com/hurricaneinsurancetaskforce/ 
TaskforceRS2/Appendix5/9aFloridaStatementWhyisRegulationofInsuranceNecessary.pdf (“We 
question the entire foundation behind the assumption that virtually no front-end regulation of 
insurance rates and terms coupled with more back-end (market conduct) regulation is better for 
consumers.”); id. at 9 (arguing that “[a]ll consumers should have access to adequate coverage”); id. 
at 14 (asserting that “insurance is an essential public good”). 
52 “The law requires businesses affected with a public interest—notably public utilities and 
common carriers—to contract with all comers on nondiscriminatory and reasonable terms.” 
Rakoff, supra note 24, at 1193 n.73 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Shavers v. Kelley, 267 N.W.2d 72, 87 (Mich. 1978) (holding that, because the purchase of no-fault 
auto insurance is required by state law, drivers have a constitutionally protected property interest 
in the availability of insurance at fair and equitable rates); Matthew O. Tobriner & Joseph R. 
Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1247, 1249, 1273 (1967) (noting that businesses such as insurance companies are “affected with 
the public interest” and that courts in interpreting insurance contracts have looked to the 
relationship of the policyholder to the insurer rather than to the consensual transaction itself 
(citations omitted)). 
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015. 
54 See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 34, 118-19. 
55 See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 234 
S.E.2d 720, 725, 730 (N.C. 1977) (stating that the state insurance commissioner must approve all 
changes in “rating method, schedule, classification, underwriting rule, bylaw, or regulations” and 
that homeowner insurers may charge rates that leave them “a fair and reasonable profit and no 
more” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
56 See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 118-27 (outlining the roles that the states, insurance com-
missioners, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners play in assuring the 
solvency of insurers through regulation and licensing). 
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for regulating public utilities and more like the rationale for regulating food 
and drugs, whose dangers are difficult to detect, but which are essential for 
individual well-being. 
A number of features of health insurance, for example, fit this concep-
tion. Along with food and shelter, access to medical care is one of the basic 
goods most essential to individual well-being. In our system, health insur-
ance is the principal vehicle through which access to medical care becomes 
available. The argument for regulating the terms and conditions under 
which health insurance operates is therefore strong, and the actual scope of 
regulation tends to reflect the importance of health insurance. 
There have long been state-mandated benefits laws that require certain 
forms of coverage—maternity benefits, for example—to be included in all 
health insurance policies.57 At the federal level, for over a dozen years the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) has addressed 
the problem of preexisting condition limitations that would otherwise affect 
the job mobility of those with group health insurance.58 And some states 
have their own, broader restrictions on preexisting condition limitations.59 
Regulatory provisions such as these, specifying what must be sold and 
under what conditions, are typical of those that apply to heavily regulated 
industries. 
Of course, the strongest example of the treatment of health insurance as 
a heavily regulated industry is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (Affordable Care Act)—the federal health care reform legislation that 
will take full effect in 2014. Beginning in 2014, it will be mandatory for 
health insurers to take all comers,60 preexisting condition limitations will be 
prohibited,61 and the federal government will effectively dictate the mini-
mum acceptable terms of coverage for all policies except those sold in the 
 
57 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 62A.041 (2012) (requiring maternity coverage for all women 
regardless of marital status). 
58 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, §§ 701, 
2701, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939-45, 1955-61 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1181 and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg). 
59 See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET REFORMS: 
PRE-EXISTING CONDITION EXCLUSIONS 3-4 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/ 
upload/8356.pdf (stating that the states’ approaches to limits on preexisting conditions exclusions 
vary, and providing a fifty-state survey). 
60 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 
Stat. 119, 156 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg) (requiring every health insurance issuer to 
accept all applicants during limited “open or special enrollment” periods and to “renew or 
continue in force such coverage at the option of the plan sponsor or the individual, as applicable”). 
61 See id. § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154 (prohibiting preexisting condition exclusions and other dis-
crimination based on health status). 
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large group market.62 Once this occurs, traces of the contract conception 
will hardly be discernible at all in health insurance. Health insurance will 
then be treated much like a public utility or heavily regulated industry. The 
vehicle for providing most people with health insurance will be a contract, 
but neither party will determine the content of most of the contract’s terms. 
Perhaps next in importance, given the incidence of auto accidents and 
the way the tort system handles them, is auto liability insurance. In all but 
urban areas where there is adequate mass transit, driving is an essential 
feature of daily life. Having auto liability insurance is not only a practical 
necessity for anyone with assets worth protecting, but also legally mandatory 
in virtually all states.63 Ensuring access to auto liability insurance on reason-
able conditions and for a tolerable cost is then necessary if individuals are 
not to be deprived of the right to drive. 
The considerable regulation of auto liability insurance resembles what 
occurs in the public utility/regulated industries field. In addition to the 
requirement in virtually all states that drivers be covered by liability 
insurance, certain key policy provisions are also mandated by statute.64 
State statutes consistently provide for a residual insurance market, which 
ensures that all who are authorized to drive can meet the statutory insur-
ance requirement.65 As in health insurance, the specification of what must 
be sold and under what conditions—a characteristic of public utility regula-
tion—also occurs in auto liability insurance.  
In both health and auto insurance however, an additional factor distin-
guishes them from public utilities and regulated industries: prices are 
regulated in a manner that is partly redistributive. After the Affordable 
Care Act takes effect, there will be only very limited bases upon which 
health insurers will be able to charge high-risk applicants higher premiums 
than low-risk applicants.66 In auto insurance the matter is more complicated, 
but there is still considerable redistribution. Auto liability insurers are 
permitted considerable room to charge high-risk drivers more than low-risk 
 
62 See id. § 1302(a), 124 Stat. at 163 (defining the “essential health benefits package” and au-
thorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to further define the package). 
63 ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 702. 
64 See e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420 (McKinney 2012) (specifying standard provisions that must 
be included in various kinds of insurance policies, including specified provisions for auto insurance 
policies). 
65 See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 771-73 (describing the residual market for auto liability 
insurance, under which applicants who are unable to obtain insurance in the ordinary market are 
offered coverage from a government-mandated or government-operated market in which private 
insurance must participate). 
66 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201 (forbidding discrimination in pricing 
coverage on the basis of any characteristic other than age, family status, rating area, or tobacco use). 
  
672 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 653 
 
drivers for their coverage.67 Statutes in every state give insurance commis-
sioners authority to regulate rates so as to ensure (among other things) that 
they are not “unfairly discriminatory,”68 but the categories used by insurers 
are lightly regulated, with the exception of a few salient prohibited charac-
teristics such as race and religion.69 On the other hand, the states maintain 
residual markets for those who cannot obtain auto insurance in the conven-
tional market.70 Typically these are the highest-risk drivers, or at least those 
whom insurers perceive to be highest-risk. Auto insurers in the state share 
revenue shortfalls that occur in the residual market, and such shortfalls are 
not uncommon. Any shortfall assessed against an insurer is either a credit 
against premium taxes or may be surcharged to the insurers’ policyholders. 
In effect, when there are shortfalls, the higher-risk drivers are subsidized by 
all other drivers.71 
In short, health insurance will soon share some of the characteristics of 
other highly regulated industries, as does auto insurance already. Auto 
insurance for high-risk drivers is also a disguised risk-distribution scheme 
that works like a tax and transfer regime, and health insurance is about to 
follow the same path. This is not a characteristic of the typical public utility 
or regulated industry. 
Moreover, as soon as one moves beyond health and auto insurance, the 
resemblance becomes even more attenuated. The importance of most other 
forms of insurance pales in comparison to health and auto liability insurance. 
Other forms of liability insurance, as well as life and disability insurance, 
for example, are far less important to individual well-being and economic 
security. Non–auto-related personal tort liability exposure is very limited. 
The limited amount of life and disability insurance in force suggests that 
most people believe they either do not need or simply cannot afford signifi-
cant amounts of either form of coverage, however fairly priced it may be.72 
 
67 State premium rate regulation was once a much more vigorous enterprise, despite the calls 
of some advocates for even more regulation. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 142-43. Thus, in this 
respect, the public utility/regulated industry conception was more accurate in the past than it is today. 
68 Id. at 119. 
69 See generally Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, The Anatomy of Insurance 
Anti-Discrimination Laws 20-21 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 289, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135800 (explaining potential 
rationales for prohibiting insurers from discriminating based on socially suspect characteristics). 
70 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
71 ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 779. 
72 See id. at 306 (indicating that the average life insurance policy purchased in 2007 provided 
only $175,000 of insurance); id. at 429 (indicating that only twenty-five percent of the American 
population is covered by private short-term disability insurance and only ten percent is covered by 
private long-term disability insurance). 
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And in my view, the number of coverage disputes in these forms of insur-
ance, which would be some evidence of the need for regulatory intervention, 
seems comparatively small. 
Exactly as would be expected, therefore, beyond health and auto liability 
insurance regulation, the public utility/regulated industry model becomes 
even less accurate. Market concentrations and the intensity of competition 
vary greatly depending on the state and on the line of insurance involved.73 
In many settings the insurance market is highly competitive, and in any 
event certainly does not resemble the classic natural monopoly that charac-
terizes traditional public utilities. When this is the case it is competition, 
not a regulatory agency, that is the effective regulator of premium rates. 
The existence of standard-form policies enhances competition by facilitating 
the comparison of prices offered by different insurers.74 Finally, outside of 
health and auto liability insurance there is not the take-all-comers require-
ment that applies to the sellers of electricity, water, and other public 
utilities. Insurers generally are permitted to reject applications for coverage. 
In short, in the very areas of insurance that are most essential to individual 
well-being, insurance regulation bears some resemblance to the public 
utility/regulated industry conception. But beyond these areas of insurance, 
this conception is a far less accurate description of what occurs. 
III. THE PRODUCT CONCEPTION 
My discussion of the contract conception revealed that there is a long 
tradition in contract law scholarship addressing the distinctive features of 
contracts of adhesion.75 It is only a slight oversimplification to say that the 
burden of this scholarship is that the terms of contracts of adhesion should 
not necessarily be binding because parties have not bargained for them and 
 
73 See Robert W. Klein, The Insurance Industry and Its Regulation, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 13, 18 tbl.2-2 (Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 
2009) (providing market concentration data for various lines of insurance). 
74 Life and disability insurers do not prepare industry-wide standard forms or pool data on 
loss experience. Property-casualty insurers do engage in these practices, but under modern 
antitrust law, the practices probably would not violate federal or state antitrust laws even in the 
absence of the statutory immunity granted to the industry. Under the state-action doctrine 
originating in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943), practices that would otherwise violate 
the federal antitrust laws are exempt if they are actively supervised by a state. And it is now well-
established that intra-industry sharing of cost data is not necessarily a U.S. antitrust violation. See, 
e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586 (1925) (permitting trade 
associations and corporations to disseminate cost data as long as they do not attempt to set prices 
or restrain competition). 
75 Cf. Kessler, supra note 3, at 631-32 (discussing the emergence of standard-form contracts); 
Rakoff, supra note 24, at 1177 (delineating the seven key features of contracts of adhesion). 
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because the promisee (here, the policyholder) is not aware of these terms 
and certainly does not understand many of them.76 The dilemma that then 
arises is how to determine which such terms are binding and which are not. 
Under the contract conception, the provisions of an insurance policy are 
presumptively valid. To invalidate, or at least to trump, a policy provision, 
the policyholder must show that a particular provision falls outside the 
bounds of freedom of contract because it is ambiguous, conflicts with the 
policyholder’s objectively reasonable expectations, is unconscionable, or 
violates public policy in some way.77 Only under these unusual circumstances 
can the policyholder question the applicability of the plain language of the 
insurance contract. In the absence of one of these situations, the provisions 
of the policy are treated as if they were specifically agreed to. The language 
of policy provisions is placed in the foreground and considerations governing 
the validity of these provisions are kept in the background. As I noted 
above, however, policyholders usually do not read their policies or have a 
meaningful choice about the coverage provisions these policies contain. So, 
in a sense, policyholders are not agreeing to a set of contract terms. Rather, 
they are buying a commodity—insurance—in the hope that it will provide 
them with what they need. 
A number of commentators have reacted to this tension within the 
contract conception by arguing that conceiving of the policy as a contract is 
not entirely accurate if the adhesive terms of an insurance policy are not 
necessarily binding on the policyholder. Rather, insurance policies are more 
like commodities—products or things.78 Buyers often purchase commodities 
 
76 See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 24, at 1242 (“Once placed in its proper context as a matter 
primarily implicating the ordering of power and freedom in our society, the general rule that 
contracts of adhesion are presumptively enforceable cannot be upheld.”). 
77 See, e.g., Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 678, 693-94 (N.D. Tex. 1998) 
(holding that insurance against liability for punitive damages is against public policy); W. David 
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
529, 540-44 (1971) (arguing that the test for validity of insurance policies should be whether a 
provision satisfies the standards to which private lawmaking, such as contracting, is subject). 
78 See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance 
Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1405-06 (2007) (discussing how “the various base forms 
and endorsements” insurance companies offer consumers “are analogous to differentiated 
products”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 
813, 818 (2009) [hereinafter, Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing] (discussing how insurance “is 
more a product or good than it is a contract”); see also Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, 
Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders’ Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 
5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 419-23 (1998) (arguing that insurance policies are defective products in 
light of the discrepancy between insurer advertising and the scope of coverage actually provided); 
Slawson, supra note 77, at 546 (describing the process of entering into a standard form contract as 
buying a promise). Another piece by Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument 
and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495 (2010) [hereinafter Stempel, The  
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subject to a set of mandatory rules regarding the seller’s obligations. When 
a car is sold, for example, although the sale takes place through a contract, 
the seller also has obligations that sound in tort. Thus, according to the propo-
nents of the product conception of insurance, insurers should be liable if the 
insurance policies they sell are defective, just as the sale of goods is ordi-
narily subject to an implied warranty of merchantability and just as product 
manufacturers are liable in tort for injuries resulting from product defects. 
The product conception is an effort both to describe the actual character 
of insurance and to expressly identify its normative implications for insur-
ance law. Under a product conception, background considerations governing 
the legal acceptability of the provisions of the policy are moved into the 
foreground. For proponents of the product conception, policy provisions 
should not be binding unless they satisfy a standard governing their suita-
bility.79  The locus of coverage disputes would therefore shift under a 
product conception. Under a contract conception, coverage disputes center 
on the meaning of applicable policy provisions.80 Under the product concep-
tion, disputes center on the validity of these provisions. 
Conceiving of insurance policies as products circumvents some of the 
dilemmas that contract theory faces in dealing with contracts of adhesion. 
The product conception underscores one of the two fundamental questions 
that any conception of insurance inevitably must confront: how to deter-
mine which of the policy provisions that insurers include in their policies to 
limit or preclude coverage are enforceable, and which are not. In my 
opinion, the product conception is a more accurate description of the nature 
and function of insurance policies—especially personal insurance policies 
sold to consumers—than the contract conception. 
In practice, however, the product conception would be a flawed basis for 
assessing the validity of insurance policy provisions. A product can rarely be 
designed so that it is perfectly safe, yet also useful and affordable. There-
fore, courts do not impose liability for many designs that are not perfectly 
safe, but sometimes cause harm. Rather, tort law imposes liability on the 
seller of a product for injuries resulting from its design only if the product 
is “defective in design.”81 The problem is that “defectiveness,” whether in a 
product or an insurance policy provision, is difficult to define and even 
 
Insurance Policy as Social Instrument], might also be thought to fall into the product conception, 
although in my view it more comfortably fits in the governance conception.  
79 See, e.g., infra note 83 (discussing Professor Schwarcz’s proposed test for the enforceability 
of insurance provisions). 
80 See supra Section I.A. 
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). 
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more difficult to apply. For a number of reasons, the concept does not easily 
lend itself to adjudication.  
A. The Deficiencies of the Cost-Benefit Approach 
The dominant test for product defects is whether the risks posed by the 
product’s design outweigh its utility.82 Assessing the utility of a product 
design, however, is a difficult, open-ended inquiry. A product design has 
implications not only for safety, but also for cost, appearance, and function-
ality. It is not clear how to weigh the safety risks a product’s design poses 
against the cost, appearance, and functionality considerations that bear on 
the design’s utility.  
Applying a risk-utility test—or what amounts to the same thing, a cost-
benefit test—to determine the validity of insurance policy provisions would 
pose at least as many difficulties as in the product context, and probably 
more. When it comes to determine whether the risk a policy provision 
posed outweighs its utility, the product conception necessarily must rely on 
some notion of the purpose of a policy provision.83 The only standard by 
which one can judge the utility of a policy provision is to determine how 
effectively the provision serves its purpose. But a provision’s purpose is 
rarely self-evident; it must be constructed, either through judicial reasoning, 
evidence, or some combination of the two. And there is little reason to 
think that the adjudicative construction of purpose will be any less open-
ended than the assessment of the utility of product designs.  
For example, consider a standard homeowners policy provision that re-
quires the policyholder to complete the repair or rebuilding of damaged or 
destroyed property before receiving the full replacement cost of the repairs 
or rebuilding. If the homeowner does not rebuild, the insurer pays only the 
(usually lower) actual cash value of the damaged property. Professor Daniel 
Schwarcz, one of the two main proponents of the product conception, cites 
this provision as a prime example of a clause that does not satisfactorily 
serve its “underwriting purpose.”84 Schwarcz argues that the underwriting 
purpose of such a limitation on coverage is to combat moral hazard, 
 
82 Id. § 2, cmt. d. 
83 See Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 1448-49 (discussing the purpose of a replacement cost en-
dorsement); Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, supra note 78, at 847-53 (discussing the 
purposes of burglary insurance and pollution exclusions). Professor Schwarcz would engage in a 
two-step process, under which the first step would be a determination of whether a policy 
provision served a legitimate underwriting purpose. Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 1445-46. If it did 
not, then it would be defective if it failed “a cost-benefit, reasonable-alternative-design test.” Id.  
84 Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 1449. 
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“prevent[ing] insurance fraud[] because . . . insureds looking to move could 
potentially profit by destroying their home and collecting insurance rather 
than selling the house” for less than its replacement cost.85  
I do not doubt that one of the purposes of such provisions is to combat 
this moral hazard.86 And I do not doubt that insurers could redraft the 
provision to achieve this purpose and still cover the policyholder who could, 
and would, rebuild if only the insurer would first pay the policyholder the 
full replacement cost.87 But the provision could have a second purpose: to 
keep premiums at an optimum level by discouraging the inefficient recon-
struction of damaged or destroyed property. When reconstructed property 
would have a market value at least equal to the cost of reconstruction, 
policyholders in a normal credit market should be able to obtain construc-
tion loans even if their insurance proceeds are not payable until replacement 
is completed. Construction loans for the full cost of replacement will be 
unavailable, however, when the reconstructed property would not be worth 
its replacement or reconstruction cost. In such a case, the mortgage provided 
as security for the loan will not be fully secured. By paying replacement cost 
only after rebuilding, the rebuilding requirement both separates inefficient 
from efficient reconstruction and avoids cross subsidization of inefficient 
reconstructors by all other policyholders. 
Thus, the rebuilding requirement not only combats ex ante moral haz-
ard, but also discourages inefficient reconstruction (in effect, ex post moral 
hazard), by making full replacement cost available only to policyholders 
who can obtain construction loans, which occurs only when reconstruction 
is not inefficient. On this view, the coverage limitation in question serves 
two underwriting purposes, not just one. It thus satisfies the cost-benefit 
test and is not defective. 
How could courts apply the defectiveness test to the rebuilding clause to 
determine whether it has the two purposes I have hypothesized, or only the 
one purpose that Schwarcz identified? Schwarcz analyzes the issue as if it 
were a pure question of law, perhaps analogous to a question of policy 
interpretation.88 In his view, apparently only the purpose of the insurer is 
relevant. On the other hand, Professor Jeffrey Stempel, the other major 
proponent of the product conception, appears to believe that the intentions 
 
85 Id. 
86 ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 271. 
87 See Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 1455 n.287. 
88 See id. at 1448 (suggesting a court inquire “whether the insurer has any legitimate under-
writing purpose for not insuring against the specific loss that befell the insured”). 
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of both the insurer and the insured are relevant to a policy provision’s 
purpose.89 
Whichever approach one takes, the perils of seeking to determine purpose 
abound. For example, it is not clear what would be involved in determining 
purpose as a matter of law. Drafting history may shed light on underwriting 
intent. But since we are concerned mainly with industry-drafted, property-
casualty insurance standard-form provisions, the intent of the drafters may 
not be the same as that of the particular insurer selling the policy. Addi-
tionally, insurers may become aware of, or come to consider important, 
additional functions that a particular policy provision performs only after 
they have used the provision for a while. If these functions count as part of 
the underwriting “purpose” of the policy, then some method of identifying 
them for the court must be employed. One can easily picture the rise of 
extended discovery into industry drafting history and individual insurers’ 
separate intentions complicating what previously would have been simple, 
straightforward policy interpretation disputes.90 
The conceptual and practical difficulties of determining a policyholder’s 
intention would be even greater. Most policyholders do not have a crystal-
lized “intent” about the scope of coverage. They have at most a general 
purpose—to obtain coverage of a particular risk, such as fire damage to a 
home or liability for automobile “accidents.” Such an intent will rarely be 
specific enough to resolve disputes over the proper scope and application of 
particular policy provisions under distinct factual circumstances.  
Some other workable touchstone for determining the specific scope of 
coverage would therefore be necessary, but a risk-utility or cost-benefit test 
has difficulty providing it. Schwarcz acknowledges that even if a policy 
provision fails his cost-benefit test, the provision is not defective if the 
desirability of avoiding “juridical” risk justifies its exclusionary breadth.91 
For example, wordings of exclusionary provisions that are highly fact-
 
89 See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, supra note 78, at 847-48. 
90 Schwarcz acknowledges these and other potential difficulties, and therefore stops short of 
recommending immediate adoption of the defectiveness approach. See Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 
1462 (noting that the products liability model “should serve as a the starting point for further 
discussion, rather than the end point for a new doctrine of insurance law”). 
91 Id. at 1448 (noting that clauses designed to minimize juridical hazard “should not be con-
sidered an insurance harm, because they serve a legitimate and important underwriting function 
that often enhances the overall efficiency of the insurance arrangement”); see also id. (explaining 
that juridical hazard “encompasses the transaction costs to insurers of deciding whether to pay a 
claim, which includes the costs of fact gathering and legal fees”). 
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dependent tend to have higher adjudication costs than wordings that are 
more exclusionary but less fact-dependent.92 
This consideration of juridical risk is sensible. But it is one thing to 
acknowledge the relevance of juridical costs, and quite another to weigh 
them against the risk that the policy provision will exclude claims consistent 
with its underwriting purpose in an effort to reduce juridical costs.93 This 
balancing is traditionally a regulatory judgment. Schwarcz, however, would 
have courts take this approach, despite the fact that they almost inevitably 
lack both the necessary expertise and the access to “legislative facts” on 
which regulators theoretically base their decisions. In effect, Schwarcz wants 
the courts to redesign insurance policy provisions in order to determine the 
suitability of a provision under scrutiny, just as the cost-benefit test asks 
juries to redesign products in order to determine whether they are defective.94 
B. Atwater Creamery and Preference Diversity 
One of the canonical cases involving a broad, and therefore arguably 
“defective,” limitation on coverage is Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western 
National Mutual Insurance Co.95 In Atwater, a burglary policy precluded 
coverage unless there were visible marks of forced entry on external doors 
and windows.96 The court held that one purpose of this limitation was to 
ensure that coverage existed only for actual third-party burglaries and not 
“inside jobs.”97 Schwarcz apparently thinks that this clause is not defec-
tive.98 In his view, the utility of this clause—reducing the juridical risk 
entailed in litigating whether each loss resulted from an inside job—
outweighs the risk associated with the denial of coverage for losses that do 
not result from inside jobs but also do not leave visible marks of entry.99 On 
the other hand, Stempel thinks the clause does not pass muster under a 
 
92 See id. (“[I]nsurance policies are written using bright-line rules that imperfectly facilitate 
legitimate underwriting purposes . . . because they are easy to apply after an insured has 
incurred a loss.”). 
93 For Schwarcz, apparently either the cost of adjudicating the application of a policy provi-
sion is relevant to whether the benefits of a particular wording outweigh its costs, or there is some 
other, unspecified test for determining whether an otherwise defective provision can be saved 
because of the juridical costs entailed in applying a less exclusionary provision. Id. at 1445-49. 
94 See id. at 1454-55 (suggesting that courts determine the existence of harm in the insurance 
context “by applying a marginal cost-benefit test premised on reasonable alternative designs”). 
95 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985) (en banc). 
96 Id. at 274. 
97 Id. at 276. 
98 See Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 1452 (noting that the “clause served a legitimate underwrit-
ing purpose”). 
99 Id. 
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defectiveness test.100 He acknowledges that there will be juridical costs if 
the visible marks requirement is not determinative in Atwater, but asserts 
that “these additional costs are likely to be minor.”101  
Thus, the two major proponents of the product conception cannot agree 
on the result that it would dictate in one of the leading cases that they contend 
would have been better handled by this conception. Their disagreement 
suggests how unpredictable and variable any assessment of the utility of 
otherwise overbroad policy provisions would be. 
1. A “Reasonable Alternative Design” Test? 
Nor would proof of the availability of a reasonable alternative design—
in this case, a more suitable policy provision—provide a way around the 
challenge of assessing the utility of a particular policy provision in light of 
its purpose. In products liability, proof of a reasonable alternative design is 
an additional requirement for defectiveness beyond the risk-utility test and 
not an alternative test for whether a defect exists.102 
There is good reason for the two separate requirements. If a court could 
find a product defective based purely on the availability of a reasonable 
alternative design—even if it satisfied the risk-utility test—then, in effect, 
there would be a defect whenever the product could be better designed. 
One would be liable for adopting anything but the best possible design. By 
analogy, a policy provision would be considered defective whenever there 
was a “more reasonable” alternative. Insurers, therefore, would be required 
to have the best provisions possible, and would be liable even if the provi-
sions they used were satisfactory. None of the proponents of the product 
conception seem to think, or at least expressly state, that insurance policy 
provisions should be required to satisfy this exacting requirement. But that 
would be the implication of a test that hinged exclusively on whether there 
were a reasonable alternative to the challenged policy language. 
In any event, even if the test for a defect were whether there was a reason-
able alternative policy provision, this would simply shift the locus of the 
problem entailed in assessing utility. Whether proposed alternative language 
was reasonable would depend in part on an assessment of its utility—thus 
implicating the same unpredictability and variability concerns that would 
 
100 Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, supra note 78, at 848-49. 
101 Id. at 848. 
102 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998) (“[A product] is 
defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of 
the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.”). 
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trouble an assessment of the provision to which this alternative would be 
compared.103 
2. The Problem of Preference Diversity 
The cost-benefit test has yet another flaw. It has difficulty accommodating 
differences in preferences—whether in taste, risk-aversion, or otherwise—
among purchasers of a product. Even if a particular risk-utility tradeoff is 
satisfactory for a majority of purchasers, others may prefer a different 
tradeoff. In the case of complex products, this concern becomes even more 
important because individual purchasers will rarely have sufficient infor-
mation—especially regarding risk—to determine their optimal tradeoff. 
Therefore, since the market for safety is imperfect, the law must apply a 
standard that attempts to capture the presumed preferences, or anticipate 
best interests, of the majority.104 When it is not feasible to offer alternative 
products with different degrees of quality, courts employ a one-size-fits-all 
legal standard. Such a standard almost inevitably fails to track the prefer-
ences or interests of some portion of those it purports to protect. Those 
who would prefer to buy a less safe, less expensive product, for instance, 
might be precluded from doing so. 
The same would be true if a product conception were applied to the 
assessment of insurance policy provisions. The cost-benefit test would treat 
all policyholders as if they had the same preferences. Yet this assumption 
would often be untrue. Schwarcz attempts to accommodate this possibility 
by requiring that there be a strong likelihood that a provision resulted from 
a market failure105—implying that if only one approach is feasible, it cannot 
be defective. But Schwarcz’s test for market failure is whether there is 
uncertainty106 “about whether the underwriting purposes of the applicable 
policy exclusion warrant not covering the loss at issue.”107 
 
103 I have argued elsewhere that the availability of a clearer expression of the insurer’s 
contended meaning of a policy provision often is an argument for labeling such a provision 
ambiguous. Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
531, 540-44 (1996). But that contention concerns linguistic clarity, not juridical utility. 
104 See infra Section IV.B. 
105 Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 1447. 
106 Instead of the term “uncertainty,” he uses the term “ambiguity.” Id. at 1447. The choice is 
unfortunate in this context because of the term’s close association with issues regarding the 
meaning of policy language. See id. at 1452 n.274 (listing cases where courts considered ambiguity 
regarding coverage). Here, the issue is whether a provision, ambiguous or not, serves its under-
writing purpose.  
107 Id. at 1448. 
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Insurance market failures result, however, not only when an insurer is in 
a monopoly-like position, but also when transaction costs prevent an insurer 
from offering a range of coverage options to reflect the different preferences 
of policyholders. For example, burglary coverage of the sort involved in 
Atwater can be either broad or narrow, requiring visible marks of entry or 
not requiring them. Some policyholders will want broader coverage at a 
higher premium, whereas others will want narrower coverage at a lower 
premium. If it is not cost-effective for insurers to offer this choice because of 
transaction costs, they must offer only one of the options. Some policyholders 
will then receive the coverage they want, but others will have to settle for 
more or less coverage than they prefer, depending on the coverage offered. 
Under these circumstances, asking about the underwriting purpose of 
the visible marks of entry provision is not very meaningful.108 The provi-
sion’s purpose is to provide the coverage that the majority of potential 
policyholders prefer. Of course, it is also possible—likely, in this instance—
that most policyholders are not aware of the visible marks provision. This 
lack of knowledge may be why it is not cost-effective to offer policyholders 
a choice of broad or narrow coverage—too much explanation is required 
given the minimal increase in premium revenue that offering a choice of 
coverage would generate. 
The only question that a defectiveness test could then answer is whether 
the coverage the insurer provides is satisfactory to the majority of its 
policyholders. However, it is unclear how a court could make such a 
determination in most instances. Only in the few cases in which it is 
obvious as a matter of law that most policyholders would want more cover-
age than was provided and would be willing to pay for it would a court be 
able to make this determination with confidence. In other cases, it is 
possible that the majority would prefer (and be willing to pay for) broader 
coverage, but there is no reliable way to adjudicate this question. Majority 
preferences would depend not only on the combination of coverage and 
prices offered, but also on the different degrees of risk aversion of potential 
policyholders. Those factors are not matters that are easily susceptible to fact-
finding in insurance coverage litigation. Even insurance regulators have 
trouble answering detailed questions about policyholder preferences like these. 
In short, the product conception of insurance would face the same problem 
that design-defect litigation faces in products liability itself. Ideally, market 
forces would present product purchasers with different combinations of safety, 
cost, and other product qualities, thereby satisfying different preferences. In 
 
108 See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text. 
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practice, however, product purchasers are not always sufficiently knowl-
edgeable about safety risks—and cannot become sufficiently knowledgeable 
in a cost-effective manner—for market forces to offer reliable optimal safety 
levels for individuals with varying preferences. 
The same is true for insurance coverage. In practice, policyholders 
usually are not sufficiently knowledgeable, and the market is not sufficiently 
supple, to offer policyholders with different preferences the type and 
amount of coverage that would be optimal for them. But courts and juries 
are also not well-suited to make such product-optimizing or coverage-
optimizing calculations. Even if they were, such calculations would at best 
only satisfy the preferences of the majority of product purchasers or 
policyholders, not minority preferences. 
This predicament is the same one that much safety regulation faces. 
Reconfiguring the test for the validity of insurance policy provisions does 
not avoid this quandary. Rather, reconfiguration changes only the terms in 
which the debate about when and how to regulate, and who should regulate, 
is carried on without changing the problems that regulation must confront: 
When is a regulator’s conclusion superior to that of the market, and how 
should a regulator deal with minority preferences when it is only feasible to 
satisfy one set of preferences? 
IV. THE GOVERNANCE CONCEPTION 
Each of the first three conceptions regard insurance as some sort of bi-
lateral transaction between the insurer and the policyholder: a more or less 
traditional contract (the contract conception),109 the sale of an essential 
good requiring regulation (the public utility conception),110 or the sale of a 
product subject to liability rules governing the quality of the product (the 
product conception).111  
A different way of looking at insurance is to understand it as a relation-
ship in which the insurer “governs” its policyholders.112 The proponents of 
 
109 See supra Part I. 
110 See supra Part II. 
111 See supra Part III. 
112 Probably the seminal work in this field is RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE 
AS GOVERNANCE (2003), which asserts that insurance governs in nine ways: it objectifies risks 
into “degrees of chance and harm,” converts risks into costs and probabilities, creates a pool of 
people interested in minimizing loss, protects against loss of capital against which the insurer 
offers indemnification, manages risk “through surveillance and audit,” makes risk “subject to 
contract and adjudication,” offers a cultural framework for conceptions such as responsibility, 
offers “a social technology of justice,” and “combin[es] aspects of collective well-being and 
individual liberty.” Id. at 47-49. 
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this conception have been selective in their use of it, mainly citing those 
practices with which the conception fits and only partially working through 
the potential implications of this conception for insurance law. 
Descriptive and explanatory treatments of this governance conception, 
for example, identify the ways in which governments and insurers exercise 
analogous powers.113 The argument is that, in some settings, insurance 
functions like government by influencing policyholders’ conduct and 
protecting them against misfortune. This view appears to conceive of 
insurance as a surrogate for government. The question is just how far to 
carry this analogy. 
In contrast, normative treatments tend to focus on the potential of in-
surance, like government, to promote solidarity and community among 
policyholders.114 The implication appears to be that each policyholder has 
ongoing responsibilities and rights that insurers’ obligations should reflect. 
This view incorporates an organizational conception of governance. How-
ever, because policyholders are not necessarily homogeneous, their interests 
will not always coincide—just as the interests of citizens under a govern-
ment do not always coincide. In insurance, the interests of the majority and 
the minority of policyholders may be in conflict. Simply recognizing that a 
question of governance is involved can neither reconcile these interests nor 
lead to a choice to favor one set of interests over the other. Principles of 
governance are required to do that. Consequently, there are complications 
in the notion of insurance as government—whether as a surrogate for 
government or as an organization uniting policyholders with conflicting 
interests—that need to be unpacked. Several aspects of these notions are 
worth exploring further.  
 
113 See, e.g., id. at 52-58 (discussing ways that insurance industry regulatory techniques mirror 
those used by the government). 
114 See François Ewald, The Return of Descartes’s Malicious Demon: An Outline of a Philosophy of 
Precaution (Stephen Utz trans.), in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSUR-
ANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 273, 277 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
EMBRACING RISK] (indicating that insurance is one of the main nongovernmental instruments for 
promoting “solidarity” among individuals); Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as 
Moral Opportunity, in EMBRACING RISK, supra, at 52, 54 (describing insurance as a system of 
“collective responsibility” for the harms faced by others). Politicians also often follow this concept-
tion. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S7941 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Christopher 
Dodd) (“In the United States of America, we believe in shared risk and shared responsibility.”). 
Jeffrey Stempel’s argument in The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument also seems to fit comfortably 
within the insurance as governance conception. See Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social 
Instrument, supra note 78, at 1495 (“The concept I am advancing could accurately be termed the 
insurance policy as social instrument, . . . public policy instrument, or even political instrument.”). 
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A. Insurance as Surrogate Government 
One of the principal insights of the insurance-as-governance scholars is 
that, in the modern state, insurers often perform quasi-governmental, 
behavior-control functions.115 For example, because liability insurance is a 
precondition to registering a car, auto insurers help to control who drives 
lawfully and what it costs to drive.116 Similarly, since physicians and others 
in the medical profession are granted hospital-admitting privileges only if 
they have malpractice insurance, malpractice insurers determine which 
physicians get these privileges.117 The practical effect is that insurers decide 
who can practice medicine in public and private hospitals, where most 
medical treatment occurs. Likewise, to combat moral hazard, property and 
liability insurers often charge experience-rated premiums. Experience-
rating premiums influences the behavior of policyholders by creating 
incentives for them to behave more carefully than they would otherwise 
behave.118  
In the behavior-control story that proponents of the governance concep-
tion tell, insurers are seen as coercing or influencing individuals to behave 
in ways that government also sometimes coerces.119 Government in effect 
relies on insurers to perform some functions that government could legiti-
mately perform but does not. 
There is a second surrogate governance function that the proponents of 
insurance as government sometimes do not emphasize, but that insurance 
performs in significant fashion. This function is the provision of the 
equivalent of governmental “entitlements.” 120  Insurers are the vehicle 
 
115 See Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK, supra note 114, 
at 1, 13 (“Whether obtained as a result of compulsion or simple prudence, insurance is a form of 
regulation.”); Carol A. Heimer, Insuring More, Ensuring Less: The Costs and Benefits of Private 
Regulation Through Insurance, in EMBRACING RISK, supra note 114, at 116, 125-28 (describing the 
manner in which the need for insurance regulates access to activities, from home buying to renting 
cars); Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, supra note 78, at 1498-1501 (describing the 
various forms of insurance that are effectively required as a condition of doing business or 
engaging in ordinary activities). 
116 See Baker & Simon, supra note 115, at 12-13 (noting that insurance is necessary to own a 
home and drive a car, and is thus “one of the greatest sources of regulatory authority over private life”). 
117 See Heimer, supra note 115, at 127 (explaining how malpractice insurance is required to 
practice midwifery or specialized medicine at hospitals). 
118 For a further discussion of experience rating’s effect on the incentives of policyholders, 
see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 72-74 (1986). 
119 See Baker & Simon, supra note 115, at 13 (noting that insurance can be “a crucial form of 
delegated state power”). 
120 Insurance-as-governance theorists actually emphasize that government and insurance are 
providing less protection against risk and more nearly “embrace” risk-taking than in the past. Id. at 3-4. 
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through which the protection against risk, one of the hallmarks of the 
modern state, is delivered. Life, health, disability, and property insurance 
all perform this function. In effect, insurance is a means of supporting the 
social welfare of policyholders who purchase coverage, sometimes voluntarily, 
but also often without much choice.121  
One possible implication of the governance conception is that insurers 
should be subject to some of the obligations that are imposed on govern-
ment because the relationship between insurers and their policyholders falls 
somewhere between the public relationship of government to its citizens 
and the private relationship between contracting parties. Governments owe 
individual citizens (and often noncitizens) obligations that ordinary private 
entities do not owe to those with whom they contract. Correlatively, 
individual citizens have both positive and negative rights against govern-
ment that they do not have against private entities. To the extent that 
insurance engages in the behavior-control and risk-protection functions that 
are characteristic of governance, we might expect to see insurance law treat 
insurers less like private entities and more like government. In any event, 
we might consider the extent to which insurance should be treated like 
government. Two examples of such possible treatment are the insurance law 
analogues to government’s obligation to provide procedural due process and 
equal protection. 
1. Insurance “Due Process” 
Ordinary contracting parties are entitled to waive their contract rights 
selectively, whether or not doing so is arbitrary or capricious. If I contract 
to sell you my car and then have second thoughts about the deal, I am liable 
to you for the value of the car in damages. This conclusion holds true 
whether I breach in good faith because I want to keep the car or in bad faith 
because I have discovered that I do not like your wife. Similarly, a car 
dealer is free to provide a complimentary replacement part to an owner 
whose vehicle’s warranty expired the week before, on the ground that the 
owner has always been a good customer, while denying such treatment to 
those who have bought their cars from other dealers in the past.122 Indeed, 
 
121 See ABRAHAM, supra note 118, at 3 (“Some features of the insurance market are left to 
individual choice, but others are regulated.”).  
122 Through the use of standard-form contract provisions that limit its obligations, a firm can 
selectively waive those limits and thereby “build a reputation for allowing customers substantial 
recourse in matters of return, repair, or alteration without committing itself to maintain the policy 
in any particular case.” Rakoff, supra note 24, at 1221. By so doing, “the firm gains the discretion to  
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nascent contracts literature suggests that one of the efficiencies of standard-
form contracts is that they permit what Professor Jason Johnston has called 
“tailored forgiveness.”123 They enable sellers to selectively waive standard 
performance requirements post-contract and thereby to favor comparatively 
reliable and nonopportunistic customers whom they could not easily 
identify in advance.124 In insurance terms, this method would consist of 
identifying and differentially treating parties who have adversely selected, 
but doing so ex post rather than in the typical manner of combating adverse 
selection ex ante. 
Government, in contrast, does not have the luxury of this form of 
discretion. For example, the government is not free to grant benefits to 
certain applicants who do not qualify for them while denying benefits to 
other unqualified applicants. I suspect that, in addition to violating the 
applicable statutory scheme, most observers would consider this sort of 
treatment to deny the latter group due process of law. 
To what extent might a governance conception of insurance subject 
insurers to an analogous obligation to treat their policyholders with a 
measure of due process? In many states, insurers are liable to their insureds 
for “bad faith” denial of valid claims.125 When there is such a denial, the 
insured is entitled to recover not only what is due under the insurance 
policy, but also extra-contractual damages, compensatory and sometimes 
punitive, above and beyond what was due under the policy. But in fact 
there is no requirement that the insured prove the insurer’s subjective bad 
faith. Rather, the dominant test to determine that a denial was legitimate is 
simply whether the insured’s claim for coverage was “fairly debatable.”126 
 
follow or ignore its practice in any given instance; the consequence, in time of dispute, is to make 
the adherent a supplicant for relief that the firm usually grants freely.” Id. at 1275. 
123 Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form 
Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 
879 (2006). 
124 See id. (explaining the function of “tailored forgiveness” in exposing hidden customer 
types who have signed standard-form contracts); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, 
One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 834 (2006) 
(describing how hotels use check-out rules in a way that is consistent with tailored forgiveness). 
125 See infra note 126. 
126 See, e.g., Zilisch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 995 P.2d 276, 279 (Ariz. 2000) (hold-
ing that an automobile insurance company “must exercise reasonable care and good faith” in 
defending a “fairly debatable” claim); LeRette v. Am. Med. Sec., Inc., 705 N.W.2d 41, 44, 50 
(Neb. 2005) (applying the “fairly debatable” standard to uphold an insurance company’s denial of 
plaintiff’s precertification request for a claim based on an upcoming hysterectomy); Trinity 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.-Freistadt v. Tower Ins. Co., 661 N.W.2d 789, 795 (Wis. 
2003) (holding that an automobile insurance company may not deny a claim without a reasonable 
basis for believing that the claim is “fairly debatable”). 
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Although this standard is nominally substantive, the threat that liability 
may be a multiple of what is due under the policy itself provides the insurer 
with the incentive to ensure that it does not deny valid claims. The result is 
a de facto right to a fairer process of consideration than might otherwise be 
provided. Moreover, in many of the bad-faith cases, there has been evidence 
of insurer misbehavior collateral to the claim itself that would probably raise 
due process concerns if it were committed by a government actor.127 The 
lesson I draw from the cases is that a bad-faith claim has a much better 
chance of succeeding if the process the insurer followed involved more than 
merely a mistaken denial of a claim that was not fairly debatable. Following 
an unfair process matters.128 
In addition to this common law duty, insurers have a variety of statutory 
duties reflecting their enhanced obligation to provide fair process. For 
example, a number of states require that health insurers provide bene-
ficiaries with the right to an administrative appeal of coverage denials.129 
And most states have also enacted the Model Unfair Insurance Practices 
Act, which authorizes insurance commissioners to regulate unfair or decep-
tive practices.130 
But insurance law provides little right to due process beyond common 
law liability for bad faith and the limited statutory duties to provide fair 
process, and probably would find it difficult to do so. Consider a typical 
situation in which an ordinary contracting party would have no obligation 
to provide fair process, but the government would have to provide due 
process. One might think that a conception of insurance as surrogate 
governance would lead to an insurance law obligation that fell somewhere in 
between these two extremes. For example, suppose that a policyholder 
completes an application for coverage and the insurer issues a policy in 
reliance on the facts stated in the application. The policyholder subsequently 
suffers a loss and makes a claim, and in the course of investigation the 
insurer begins to suspect the policyholder is engaging in the most egregious 
form of adverse selection: he knowingly misrepresented facts about the risks 
he posed on his insurance application. But the insurer is never able to 
secure proof of the fraud. Instead, the insurer denies the coverage claim on 
grounds it would not apply to policyholders whom it does not suspect of 
 
127 See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 452-53 (suggesting that many of the cases have this feature). 
128 Id. at 453. 
129 See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 361 (2002) (analyzing an 
Illinois law that requires independent medical review of denied claims that are appealed). 
130 See UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT, at ST-900-1 to -6 (Nat’l Ass’n of 
Ins. Comm’rs 2012); see also ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 119 (explaining the various powers states 
typically give to insurance commissioners). 
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fraud. 131  A similar hypothetical involving the most egregious form of 
suspected moral hazard—arson, for example—could also be constructed. 
However, no doctrine in insurance law precludes the insurer with an 
ulterior motive from using this type of subterfuge if in fact the validity of 
the insured’s claim was otherwise “fairly debatable,” the test for bad-faith 
denial of a claim in most states.132 The insurer is free to insist on or waive 
its rights to deny coverage as it sees fit, asserting its defense to some 
policyholders’ claims but waiving the defense to claims by others under the 
same circumstances.133 The insurer thus has discretion to insist upon or waive 
its contract rights in the same way that the car dealer in my earlier hypothet-
ical is free to insist on or waive the provisions of its automobile warranties. 
The absence of any affirmative legal obligation for insurers to apply the 
same standards to all claims is considerable evidence that the reach of the 
private government conception is limited. While insurers have an obligation 
to provide their insureds with certain features of fair process, this obligation 
does not extend to applying the same substantive standards to all claims. 
But should they be under such an obligation? 
The arguments in favor of such an obligation might follow directly from 
the very notion of insurance as surrogate governance. Insurance is a good 
that is important—if not essential—to individual and business well-being. 
Given the role that insurance and insurers play in furthering such well-
being, candid and disinterested claim-processing, rather than self-interested 
conduct, could be made obligatory. And as in other long-term relationships 
where exiting is difficult or costly—such as membership in a labor union or 
certain kinds of employment—there is a need for procedural protections 
against opportunistic behavior by the dominant party. A requirement that 
 
131 See, e.g., Heller v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 833 F.2d 1253, 1257 (7th Cir. 1987). In 
Heller, a disability insurance policy covered lost income resulting from the “complete inability of 
the Insured, because of injury or sickness, to engage in the Insured’s regular occupation.” Id. at 
1255. The policyholder was a cardiologist who specialized in invasive procedures and contracted 
carpal tunnel syndrome, a condition affecting the dexterity of his hand and fingers, months after 
he purchased the policy. Id. at 1254-55. The insurer denied coverage because the insured refused to 
undergo an elective surgery, which could have allowed the insured to return to practice. Id. at 
1255. A second potential ground for denial of coverage, however, could have been that the insured 
was still able to “engage” in his “regular occupation.” Id. The insurer’s stated basis for denying 
coverage was so likely to fail that the alternative of suspected fraud is a far more plausible 
explanation for the insurer’s decision to fight the claim all the way to its unsuccessful appeal to the 
Seventh Circuit. 
132 See supra note 126. 
133 State unfair-insurance-practices laws conceivably would reach such behavior through their 
prohibition of “[f]ailing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in the 
insurance policy . . . for the denial of a claim” when “perform[ed] with such frequency as to 
indicate a general business practice.” CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(13) (West 2005).  
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insurers provide claimants the real rationale for denying a claim, and act 
only on that reason, could help satisfy that need. In contrast, giving insurers 
the right to engage in subterfuge increases the risk that they will deny valid 
claims that they incorrectly believe are the products of adverse selection or 
undue moral hazard. Some claimants will in effect face silent accusations of 
such behavior without ever having the opportunity to disprove the insurer’s 
suspicion—indeed, often without even knowing of the suspicion or that it is 
the insurer’s actual reason for denying the claim. 
Two arguments against recognizing a due process–like obligation of 
candid disclosure, however, put the case for it seriously in doubt. First, as I 
will argue below, any conception of insurance as governance should recog-
nize that government often acts for the benefit of the majority of its con-
stituents. Insurance claimants who are guilty of fraud or arson seek 
unjustifiably to obtain payment of funds that would otherwise be devoted to 
the payment of valid claims. Ultimately, this is a cost to current or future 
policyholders, whose premiums must rise if invalid claims are paid. Most 
honest policyholders probably do not want to pay premiums that will some-
times pay fraudulent policyholders, even if this means that the occasional 
policyholder who is incorrectly suspected of fraud is denied coverage.134 
Second, expressly recognizing a due process–like obligation might be an 
empty gesture. One reason that there is no law on this issue may be that a 
policyholder would have difficulty raising the issue effectively. Just to pose 
the issue, a policyholder would have to obtain evidence that (1) the insurer 
suspected the insured of adverse selection or moral hazard which, if proved, 
would be a valid basis for denying the claim; and (2) in the absence of its 
suspicions, the insurer would not have denied the claim on the same basis 
that it actually asserted for denying it. Proving only condition (1) would be 
insufficient, because otherwise the existence of the insurer’s suspicions 
would have no causal connection to the denial of the claim. However, 
obtaining evidence of (2)—evidence of causation—would require discovery 
into and the compilation of a vast amount of data from an insurer’s files. In 
my view, courts would probably exercise their discretion not to permit such 
discovery: the files might not always reveal the insurer’s putative suspicions, 
and the cost of obtaining and then analyzing data would likely be prohibi-
tive except on a class-wide basis or in connection with claims involving very 
high potential recovery. It is no surprise, then, that in over thirty years of 
studying insurance law, I have never encountered a case making such a 
 
134 Cf. supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. 
  
2013] Four Conceptions of Insurance 691 
 
claim. Moreover, few courts would even want to entertain the possibility of 
such litigation. 
For these reasons, there probably never has been a meaningful oppor-
tunity for policyholders to attempt to develop a right to due process–like 
treatment from their insurers. The extent to which the courts would 
recognize such a right, and thereby make law that further reflects the 
private government conception, is therefore not clear. Instead, the interest 
of insureds as a group in the candid disclosure of the insurer’s actual reasons 
for denying claims is partially protected by the threat of liability for the 
bad-faith denial of claims.135 If the insurer suspects an insured of fraud or 
arson, but cannot prove it and denies a claim on the basis of a defense that 
is not even fairly debatable, the insurer is liable for extra-contractual 
damages.136 The number of other cases in which the basis for denial of the 
claim is fairly debatable, but is not the insurer’s actual reason for denying 
the claim, may not be large. If so, then the absence of an express remedy for 
this kind of subterfuge may not be significant. 
2. Insurance “Equal Protection” 
Insurance law provides some protection against the unequal treatment of 
policyholders. However, most of this protection is provided for by statute 
or regulation rather than the common law, and the protection is limited. At 
the state level, both legislative and regulatory directives prohibit the use of 
certain classification variables in setting premium rates,137 even if the rate 
classes produced would be actuarially sound. Insurance commissioners in 
every state have the authority to prohibit rates that are “unfairly discrimina-
tory,”138 and state statutes sometimes single out particular variables for 
prohibition in connection with certain forms of insurance. For example, a 
Hawaii statute prohibits auto insurance companies from basing standards or 
rating plans on “race, creed, ethnic extraction, age, sex, length of driving 
experience, credit bureau rating, marital status, or physical handicap.”139 
Certain forms of classification based on genetics are also regulated. At the 
federal level, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
(GINA) prohibits health insurers from requesting or using individuals’ 
 
135 See supra note 126. 
136 See supra text accompanying notes 125-26. 
137 See infra note 139. 
138 See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 119. 
139 HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-207 (2005). 
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personal genetic information in underwriting or risk-classification. 140 
Moreover, “over half the states have enacted legislation that prohibits or in 
some way limits insurers from requiring genetic testing of applicants or 
from asking for the results of testing done independently.”141 
There is no single factor common to all of insurance law’s efforts to 
promote equality, any more than a single factor is common to all the 
equality protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution or other sources of 
legal authority. However, one factor common to a substantial subset of 
these equality efforts in insurance law involves uncontrollable causes of loss. 
Many of these protections rule out the consideration of characteristics over 
which policyholders have no control—mental health, gender, race, genetic 
makeup, etc.142 It is as if insurance law has decided that at least some of the 
risks associated with what Rawls termed “the natural lottery”143 should be 
shared by all policyholders, rather than advantaging some and disadvantaging 
others. Thus, a norm of equal treatment of uncontrollable risks seems to be at 
the heart of many of insurance law mandates that resemble equal protection. 
What about the possibility of going further and placing even stronger 
limits on the extent of an insurer’s authority to vary premiums based on the 
degree of risk posed by the insured? After all, government “charges” 
everyone the same rate for Social Security and Medicare insurance.144 
Unfortunately, providing an answer requires more than merely shifting 
from a contract to a governance conception of insurance. This is because 
adopting a governance conception does not itself dictate to what kind of 
theory of government one subscribes. Governance, after all, can be either 
 
140 Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 101–104, 122 Stat. 881, 883-903 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 
29 & 42 U.S.C.). 
141 ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 153-54. 
142 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
143 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75 (1971). 
144 In fact, the way in which government charges everyone the same rate for these forms of 
public insurance is more complicated than this rhetorical question implies. When government 
pays for services out of general revenues and these revenues are raised primarily through 
progressive income taxes, everyone is not charged the same rate for these services. The wealthy 
pay more for the same service than the less wealthy. We may make up the difference in practice 
by providing the wealthy with greater access to federal farm subsidies, Department of Commerce 
services, better local policing, or garbage removal services, but, at least formally, the wealthy pay 
more for these services because they are financed by progressive taxation. In contrast, the decision 
to finance Social Security and Medicare through flat-rate income taxation with a comparatively 
low income-ceiling—relative to financing them out of general revenues—is actually a regressive 
approach. It may charge everyone the same rate based on their risk levels, but doing so costs the 
poor a higher percentage of their income than the wealthy. In effect, there is very broad sharing of 
the cost of general government services—because they are financed by progressive taxation—but 
less sharing of the cost of Social Security and Medicare between the poor and the wealthy. The 
poor bear a cost burden that is greater for them than it is for the wealthy. 
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heavily or lightly egalitarian. Therefore, conceiving of insurance rate 
classification as posing an equal protection–like issue does not tell us how to 
resolve the issue. 
Perhaps the strongest explanation for insurance law’s apparent reluc-
tance to regulate insurance classification in a more egalitarian manner is that 
doing so could create more adverse selection and cross-subsidization than 
most people would find acceptable. In general, there is little prohibition of 
rate classification based on controllable characteristics. For example, liability 
insurers, including auto liability insurers, are permitted to base their rates in 
part on the insured’s past loss experience.145 It is true that the risk of 
adverse selection has sometimes been exaggerated.146 However, the fact that 
the risk has been exaggerated does not make it nonexistent. If experience 
rating were not permitted, higher risk drivers would tend to buy more 
coverage than they would otherwise, and yet they would not have paid 
premiums commensurate with the rate of claims that they would make. 
Average and low-risk drivers—by definition the majority of drivers—would 
in effect be subsidizing the riskier driving minority. These drivers would 
not want to do that.  
Insurance law could nonetheless require that this minority benefit at the 
expense of the majority, but that would involve an allocation of resources to 
the minority where the justification for such an allocation would be uncer-
tain. In fact, it is this sort of conflict between the majority and the minority 
that is characteristic of the governance of organizations. This conflict is in 
turn reflected in the second conception of insurance as governance. 
B. Insurance as Organization: The Relationship Between the  
Majority and Minority of Policyholders 
In addition to the conception of insurance as surrogate government, the 
governance conception might see insurance as a set of relationships among 
policyholders. Under this conception the insurer would be more like an 
agent or trustee, serving the purposes of its policyholder-principals, with 
profits (when permitted) earned by the payment of fees to the insurer for 
this service.147 Individual insurer-policyholder contracts would be seen as 
 
145 E.g., Your Choice Auto Insurance Options, ALLSTATE, http://www.allstate.com/auto-insurance/ 
auto-insurance-features.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (safe-driving bonus). 
146 See, e.g., Siegelman, supra note 16, at 1244 (noting that theoretical models and empirical 
studies failed to support the importance of adverse selection in insurance markets). 
147 Mutual insurance companies come closer in legal form to this conception than stock com-
panies because their policyholders own mutual insurers. Yet since mutual insurance policyholders  
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merely serving as the legal mechanism for bringing the institution of 
insurance into being. Insurers would be understood as the intermediary 
through which individuals, motivated by concern for themselves, become 
part of an enterprise that transforms selfish concern into altruism.148 
In considering insurance as surrogate government, as I did in the pre-
ceding section, a single policyholder could properly be understood to stand 
for all the policyholders. However, in considering the relationship between 
the majority and minority of policyholders, we cannot indulge in this 
assumption. One impact of looking at insurance as a set of relationships 
within an organization is that, for certain purposes, the insurer is set off to 
the side, and the relationship among those who are governed—the policy-
holders—is placed into sharper focus. Certain practices that might other-
wise appear to be advantage-taking by the insurer may then be seen as 
market reactions to demand by the majority of policyholders. 
For example, sellers in a market have an incentive to try to satisfy the 
preferences of even a minority of consumers. In fact, markets are often 
superior to politics at dealing with conflicts between the interests of the 
majority and the minority.149 Yet there comes a point at which all demand 
cannot be satisfied at an acceptable price. A minority of consumers want a 
product or service that is not cost-effective for sellers to provide because of 
the lack of demand. Shoe manufacturers make shoes in half-sizes, even 
though a few consumers would like them made in quarter-sizes, because 
most people find half-sizes acceptable and would not pay the additional cost 
entailed in obtaining a more perfect fit. Similarly, limitations on coverage 
for mental health care in health insurance arguably reflect the preferences of 
the majority (whether these preferences are in the majority’s long-term self-
interest is a separate question) for greater coverage—other things being 
equal—for physical rather than for mental health care. Limitations on 
burglary insurance to losses evidenced by “visible marks on the exterior of 
the building” that operated in Atwater Creamery150 may reflect the prefer-
ence of the majority for avoiding additional premiums that would be 
 
rarely exercise control of or influence over management, the difference between mutual and stock 
insurance companies is more apparent in theory than reality. 
148 Cf. Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 518 
(1983) (noting that controversies about insurance classification “reveal the strain produced by the 
opposition of individual autonomy and intragroup solidarity”); Kimball, supra note 47, at 491-98 
(suggesting that the purposes of insurance law include promoting reasonableness between the 
insurer and its policyholders as well as promoting equity among policyholders). 
149 HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 288 (1996). 
150 Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985); see 
also supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text. 
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involved in case-by-case inquiries into whether a loss was the result of an 
actual burglary or an inside job. On this view, much of the criticism aimed 
at insurers may actually reflect insurers’ responses to majority preferences. 
However, it is also true that once we begin to conceive of insurance as 
organizational governance, these phenomena may take on a different 
valence. It may well matter if we think of the minority, not as a set of 
people with idiosyncratic tastes that they cannot afford to satisfy, but as 
members of a community whose interests conflict with those of the majority. 
Then the question would be whether and when insurance law, as a tool by 
which policyholders “govern” themselves, should prescribe rules that trump 
the market’s tendency to satisfy majority rather than minority preferences.  
As I noted above in discussing insurance “equal protection,” insurance 
law as it currently stands has chosen to protect policyholder minorities 
mainly against disadvantages resulting from uncontrollable characteristics—
race, religion, gender, and genetics, for example. Different versions of 
insurance as governance might choose an even more egalitarian, or a far less 
egalitarian (or even libertarian) approach.  
But one of the controllable characteristics that insurance law typically 
has chosen to make the responsibility of each policyholder, rather than to 
share among all policyholders, is the decision to engage in opportunistic 
behavior. Two major threats that opportunism poses for the insurance 
function are adverse selection151 and moral hazard.152 Restrictions on coverage 
 
151 Adverse selection is the greater tendency of those who are at above average risk of suffer-
ing a loss to seek coverage of the risk of loss. ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 6. Insurers attempt to 
combat adverse selection through a number of methods. With the exception of prohibitions on 
rate classifications based on uncontrollable characteristics, regulators typically permit insurers to 
use these methods of combating adverse selection. For example, insurers may seek risk-related 
information from applicants for coverage and then base the premiums they charge on the level of 
risk that this information reveals. Id. at 7. Insurers may also include limitations in their policies 
designed to preclude coverage of losses that, if covered, would be particularly likely to generate 
adverse selection. Id. Thus, homeowners policies place dollar ceilings on the amount of coverage 
provided for jewelry losses, and life insurance policies limit coverage of loss resulting from suicide 
within one year of the date of the issuance. Id. at 197-98, 312. 
152 Moral hazard is “the tendency of any insured party to exercise less care to avoid an 
insured loss than would be exercised if the loss were not insured.” Id. at 7. Insurers attempt to 
combat moral hazard by basing premiums in part on past losses, thereby creating an incentive for 
policyholders to exercise care to avoid loss even though they are insured, in order to reduce 
premiums in subsequent policy periods. Id. In addition, insurers include limitations on coverage in 
their policies designed, directly or indirectly, to combat moral hazard. For example, all liability 
insurance policies exclude coverage of loss that is “expected or intended” or caused intentionally 
by the insured. Id. at 533. And Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurance policies purchased 
by most businesses in the United States exclude coverage of liability for injury or damage caused 
by pollution. Id. at 467-68. In my view, this decision is based at least in part on the ground that  
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and legal doctrines designed to combat these threats are sometimes seen as 
the product of overreaching by insurers.153 There are certainly a number of 
examples of insurer overreaching in the name of protecting against these 
threats. But it is also plausible to understand many efforts by insurers to 
combat adverse selection and moral hazard as methods of preventing the 
minority of applicants and policyholders from taking advantage of the 
majority. 
If high-risk applicants for insurance could obtain coverage that did not 
take into account the degree of risk they posed, then adverse selection could 
result as lower-risk applicants disproportionately failed to purchase cover-
age, purchased less coverage than they would otherwise purchase, or 
continued to purchase coverage, in effect cross-subsidizing higher-risk 
applicants. Permitting insurers to combat this tendency allows the majority 
to protect itself against the minority of adverse selectors; placing restric-
tions on insurers’ use of devices that combat adverse selection creates 
“minority rights.”  
Similarly, if no policy provisions or insurer practices combated moral 
hazard, then some policyholders would behave less carefully than they 
would have behaved in the absence of coverage, disadvantaging others who 
did not relax the degree of care they exercised. Permitting insurers to use 
these policy provisions and follow these practices protects the majority from 
the behavior of the minority; placing restrictions on insurers’ use of devices 
that combat moral hazard creates “minority rights.” 
I have heard insurers invoke this kind of rationale for certain of their 
practices. They argue, for example, that it would be unfair to safe drivers if 
insurers did not surcharge the premiums of drivers who had made claims in 
the prior policy year. And, in the past, insurers contended that prohibiting 
preexisting-condition limitations in individual, voluntarily-purchased health 
insurance would encourage people to wait until they became ill to purchase 
insurance, thus taking advantage of those who had purchased insurance 
while they were healthy. Behavior by a minority of policyholders that 
imposes a cost on the majority, however, infringes on the rights of that 
majority only if the majority has no duty to the minority regarding that 
behavior. If people have a right to health insurance, whether or not they 
 
gradual pollution is likely to be somewhat controllable by policyholder precautions that the insurer 
is unable to observe. 
153 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 16, at 249; Siegelman, supra note 16, at 1232 (noting one com-
mentator’s view “that expanded tort liability led to a series of adverse selection death spirals . . . 
leading ultimately to a complete collapse of certain segments of the liability insurance market”). 
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have purchased it before they become ill, then preexisting-condition 
limitations violate the rights of the minority, not the majority.  
That is, the governance conception helps us to understand insurance 
rights and obligations as running not only de jure between insurers and 
policyholders, but also de facto among policyholders. The governance 
conception, however, cannot tell us the substance of these rights. It cannot 
tell us what rights the majority should have against the minority, or what 
rights the minority should have against the majority. It takes a theory of 
substantive insurance rights and obligations to do that. For example, such a 
theory might be that only certain uncontrollable characteristics should be 
prohibited from use in rate classification. A classification based on gender 
might be acceptable in pricing life insurance and annuities because, 
although the former distinction disadvantages women, the latter advantages 
them. Or the theory might hold that classification in auto liability insurance 
should be heavily based on the number of miles driven, in order to encour-
age use of alternative, energy-conserving forms of transportation. 154 In 
short, under the governance conception decisions about the rights and 
obligations of policyholders among themselves are political. If the law is to 
trump or supplant what the market would provide about these rights and 
obligations, it must do so not only based on the notion that insurance is 
governance, but based on a particular theory regarding the duties of the 
majority to the minority. Without such a theory, we have a framework for 
analyzing the question, but no basis for answering it. 
CONCLUSION 
The lesson of this Article is that employing different conceptions of 
insurance may help us see the entirety of insurance and insurance law more 
clearly, and may highlight certain normative possibilities that other concep-
tions hide or underemphasize. Having different conceptions of insurance 
may shed additional light on the two fundamental questions insurance law 
perpetually faces: how binding the language of insurance policies should be, 
and what role public law values should play in insurance law. 
Thus, the contract conception reflects the importance of policy language 
and highlights the potential importance of fine differences in coverage, but 
it does not adequately account for policyholder rights that are at variance 
 
154 Cf. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Automobile Injuries as Injuries with Remedies: Driving, Insurance, 
Torts, and Changing the “Choice Architecture” of Auto Insurance Pricing, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 69, 82-
84 (2010) (arguing that auto insurance laws imprudently encourage driving despite “the huge 
public health problems, environment degradation, and other costs caused by cars”). 
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with policy language. The public utility/regulated industry conception 
captures the way that insurance law reflects the essential importance of 
health and auto liability insurance, but does not accurately depict the way 
insurance law treats other areas of insurance. The product conception may 
accurately describe the sense in which insurance is a product, rather than a 
contract, for most ordinary consumers, but it has not developed a suitable 
test for evaluating the validity of the insurance product’s design. And the 
governance conception may be better than the others at explaining certain 
features of insurance law—the cause of action for bad-faith breach, 
restrictions on risk classification based on uncontrollable characteristics, and 
the treatment of policy provisions combating adverse selection and moral 
hazard—but there are large areas of insurance and insurance law about 
which it has little to say. 
Moreover, when we turn from the descriptive to the normative features 
of these conceptions, none can by itself resolve the issues over which they 
contest. To use the now standard cliché, each paints a different view of the 
cathedral, and from that painting normative implications follow.155 The 
combined descriptive and normative exercise produces a more rounded and 
complete picture than the contract conception alone. However, we should 
not suppose—as the proponents of particular conceptions sometimes seem 
to do—that developing a conception can itself tell us how insurance should 
change, or what insurance law should be. The exercise can bring into the 
foreground what the contract conception sometimes relegates to the back-
ground. But the particular lens through which we view insurance law cannot 
tell us what principles should govern or what policy choices to make. The 
way we look at insurance law can only bring to our attention the availability 
of choices that the dominant conceptual structure had previously camou-
flaged. We still have to make the actual choices ourselves. 
 
 
155 For the origins of this metaphor, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089-90 
n.2 (1972). 
